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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the constitutional position of personally appointed 
advisers to New Zealand government ministers' offices. Personal appointees 
are formally employed as public servants on events-based contracts. 
However, they work as partisan ministerial assistants and thus are not subject 
to the public service constitutional convention of political neutrality. 
Therefore, constitutionally they are interposed between ministers and public 
servants. 
The practice of ministers making personal appointments to their offices 
has proliferated since the 1980s. In general, personal appointees make a 
positive contribution to both ministers and public servants. On the other hand, 
several objections can be made to their role. That is, they may unlawfully 
exercise executive power, mislead the public through the media, exacerbate 
tensions in the minister-public servant relationship and undermine public 
servant neutrality. 
The paper draws on the expenences of Australia and the United 
Kingdom in seeking to address concerns regarding personal appointees in New 
Zealand. While much of the criticism of personal appointees' role in New 
Zealand appears to be based more on perception than reality, Australian and 
United Kingdom experiences illustrate the reality of the risk of abuse of 
power. 
Thus, this paper recommends that personal appointees be legally 
distinguished from public servants to better reflect the reality of their position. 
Secondly, it recommends the adoption of separate personal appointee and 
public servant codes of conduct as a guide for personal appointees, ministers, 
public servants and the public. Thirdly, the paper recommends induction and 
training for incoming personal appointees regarding the New Zealand system 
of government. Finally, it advocates a complaints procedure to safeguard the 
integrity of relationships between ministers, public servants and personal 
appointees. 
6 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, annex and 
bibliography) comprises about 14 450 words. 
MINISTERS' PERSONAL APPOINTEES: PART POLITICIAN, PART 
BUREAUCRAT 
I INTRODUCTION 
Who is the real Minister of Health? Annette King or the Prime 
Minister's senior adviser Heather Simpson? 1 
[New Zealand High Commissioner in London, Russell] 
Marshall's account of the chemistry between Clark and Simpson 
- her closest adviser and eminence grise - is telling. 
"If I'd had someone as good as that, who knew my instincts, 
who could go into another room and meet someone else and 
whom I could trust absolutely to say what I think and pick up the 
essence of it, who could be another rair of legs, ears and eyes for 
me, I'd have grabbed her - or him." 
It 's hardly a novel observation - 0 what a tangled web we 
weave, when first we practise to deceive - but modern statecraft 
has increasingly devoted itself to the (how appropriate the verb) 
spinning of threads from which those webs are woven . 
. . . the lesson should be simple: spinning makes you dizzy, then 
you fall down.3 
7 
Over the last two decades, personally appointed advisers to 
government ministers' offices have become a reasonably well-established part 
of New Zealand politics. Personal appointees are in general employed to 
provide high level policy and advice to ministers .4 This policy and advice is 
often of an explicitly partisan nature. Thus within a minister's office they are 
interposed between the minister that they serve and the public servants that 
they work alongside. However, the presence of these advisers is not well 
known publicly, despite their often influential status in government. As such, 
there has been little academic or public discussion of their constitutional 
status. 
Personally appointed advisers give rise to tensions in the New Zealand 
political framework. On the one hand, the effectiveness of a personal 
1 Wyatt Creech, New Zealand National Party "Will the Real Health Minister Please Stand 
Up?" (4 May 2000) Press Release. 
2 Carson Scott "Carson Scott Talks to Ru sell Marshall (our man in London)" (2 1 June 2003) 
The Listener New Zealand 13. 
3 Finlay McDonald "Murder Will Out" (2 August 2003) The Listener New Zealand 7. 
4 Ministerial Services Job Profile: Ministerial Advisor (Wellingto n, 2003) 2. 
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appointee depends on absolute confidentiality and the ability to determine and 
act on a minister' s viewpoint. In order to be useful to a minister, a personal 
appointee must be able to act on his or her behalf, without requiring detailed 
and time consuming instructions. 
On the other hand, constitutional principle demands that any exercise 
of government power be accountable to Parliament and the public. Ministers 
are responsible to Parliament for the actions they undertake as ministers and 
for acts performed on their behalf. 5 Yet full accountability as regards personal 
appointees may be impeded by the secrecy of their role. This may be 
exacerbated where a personal appointee undertakes functions without the 
explicit instruction or even the knowledge of the minister. Furthermore, in 
practice there appears to be little effort to hold personal appointees to account 
at all, either personally or through the relevant minister. Thus there is a 
tension between political reality and the constitutional need for full 
accountability. 
Personal appointees also give rise to issues in relation to the public 
service. In particular, they may control public servants ' access to their 
minister and consequently undermine the relationship between these two 
actors . As well, public servants must act in a politically neutral manner.6 
Within a minister ' s office, having to work alongside staff who are overtly 
political may potentially undermine the neutrality of public servants. Finally, 
personal appointees who deal with media issues may be perceived as 
controlling communications in a manner which is misleading to the public. 
This paper seeks to clarify the constitutional position of personal 
appointees . In order to do thi s, the behavioural norms relating to ministers 
and public servants are first examined. Because these are the actors whom 
personal appointees work alongs ide, clarifying their position throws light on 
that of personal appointees. The paper then addresses the constitutional status 
5 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001 ) 16. 
6 State Services Commiss ion Public Service Code of Conduct (State Services Commission, 
Wellington, 2001 ) 9. 
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of personal appointees by reference to ministers and public servants and to the 
constitutional conventions which guide their behaviour. Within this context, 
the functions which personal appointees undertake are found to make a 
valuable contribution to the New Zealand political system. However, these 
functions also create the potential for abuses of power and constitutionally 
inappropriate behaviour. Consequently, United Kingdom ("UK") and 
Australian experiences provide possibilities for dealing with these problems. 
The expe1iences of these two countries also reinforce the need for New 
Zealand to address potential problems. Thus, the paper recommends that 
personal appointees be legally distinguished from public servants. As well , it 
recommends the adoption of separate codes of conduct for personal 
appointees and public servants. Finally, it advocates training for incoming 
personal appointees and the implementation of a procedure to allow 
complaints to be made about personal appointees ' conduct. 
In the following section, the context in which personal appointees 
work is examined. Firstly, the nature of New Zealand's system of government 
is described. This explains how power is divided in the State. Because 
personal appointees are interposed between ministers and public servants, the 
constitutional controls on the exercise of power by these two sets of actors are 
addressed. This allows comparison and contrast between these actors and 
personal appointees. As a result, the constitutional position of personal 
appointees can be established. This analysis also highlights issues that may be 
of concern as regards personal appointees, for example in relation to 
accountability and their impact on the minister-public servant relationship. 
II THE CONTEXT IN WHICH PERSONAL APPOINTEES ACT 
New Zealand government ministers ' offices employ several types of 
staff. These include administrative staff, public servants seconded from 
government departments , and personal appointees .7 The first aid the minister 
7 Colin James Tlze Tie That Binds: The Relations/zip Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 59 . 
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in terms of secretarial and administrative functions. 8 In a formal legal sense, 
personal appointees are employed in the same way as public servants. That is, 
they are employed under the State Sector Act 1988 by the Ministerial Services 
branch of the Internal Affairs Department. 9 However, public servants are 
employed as politically neutral policy advisers and ministerial assistants. In 
contrast, personal appointees are in general employed to provide rrunisters 
with explicitly partisan advice and to deal with political risk management. 10 
In practice, they may act as all-purpose assistants to a minister. Particular 
functions of personal appointees may include undertaking intra-coalition and 
intra party negotiations, managing media issues, providing policy advice and 
acting as a conduit between ministers and departmental public servants. 11 
Personal appointees act within a broadly Westminster style democracy 
adapted to New Zealand's particular circumstances. A modem Ii beral 
democracy in this tradition is underpinned by the notion of government by or 
8 James, above, 59. 
9 James, above, 60. 
10 Richard Shaw "Advisers and Consultants" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand 
Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2001) 153. 
11 Ministerial Services Job Profile: Ministerial Advisor (Wellington, 2003) identifies the 
following as "Key Responsibilities/Tasks : 
l. Providing political oversight and independent advice on policy proposals 
and submissions received. 
2. Monitoring relevant cabinet committee papers/minutes to ensure that any 
issues of significance are drawn to the Minister's attention. 
3. Managing the Ministerial office relationship with Coalition and support 
party spokespeople and working with Prime Minister's Office on relevant 
support party consultation issues. 
4. Liaising with government members on select committees on relevant 
legislation to ensure the government is kept abreast of developments. 
5. Managing OIA requests, including being able to identify potential political 
issues which may arise and liaising with Prime Minister's office as required. 
6. Ensuring the Minister is appropriately briefed for all House responsibilities. 
7. Liaising with Caucus Committees and Research Units. 
8. Risk management of issues within Minister's [sic] portfolios and ensuring 
the Prime Minister's office is kept informed about potential risks and 
opportunities. 
9. Attending meetings with officials, sector organisations, and any other 
relevant meetings as required. 
10. Where required, providing input into the government's strategic planning. 
11. Liaising with portfolio advisors, Senior Private Secretary, Press Secretary 
and other office staff on the implementation of portfolio plans. 
12. Working with appropriate Associate Ministers' and Under-Secretaries' staff 
in relation to the Minister's portfolios. 
13. Effective liaison and relationship development with key stakeholders in 
Ministers' portfolios. 
14. Other duties as required." 
11 
with the consent of the people. 12 That is, the people delegate their sovereignty 
to their parliamentary representatives. 13 
The New Zealand political system is predicated on responsible 
government, 14 in other words a government drawn from and responsible to an 
elected Parliament. 15 It is a basic tenet of the Westminster political framework 
that the exercise of government power is at root accountable to Parliament. 
The government is thus accountable to the people through their parliamentary 
representatives .16 Such responsibility is the key means by which democratic 
accountability is exercised. Parliament possesses legal sovereignty and 
expresses support for a government through confidence votes. 17 In practice, 
ministers delegate much of the exercise of government power to public 
servants. 18 Therefore, ministers must also be responsible to Parliament for the 
actions of public servants. 
The New Zealand system has developed to reflect several other 
important principles. Firstly, New Zealand government has become more 
open and its processes more transparent. This has occun-ed through the 
enactment of official information legi slation , which seeks "to make official 
information more freely available." 19 The Official Information Act ("OIA") is 
buttressed by other reforms, such as the establi shment of the Office of 
Ombudsman in 1962,20 other statutory requirements providing for freedom of 
infoimation ,21 the passage of the New Zealand Bill of Ri ghts Act 1990 and the 
12 Richard Mul gan Democracy and Power in New Zealand: a Study of New Zealand Politics 
(Oxford Uni versity Press, Auckland , 1984) 8, 13. 
13 H B Mayo An Introduction to Democratic Theory (Oxford Uni versity Press, New York, 
1960) 72-73. 
14 In thi s paper, "government" refers to the Executi ve branch of government. 
15 Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative La w in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001 ) 8; Constitution Act 1986, s6. 
16 Sir Ivor Jennings Cabinet Government (3 ed, Cambridge U ni versity Press, Cambridge, 
1959) 90. 
17 Constitution Act 1986, s l4. 
18 Sir l vor Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5 ed , Uni versity of London Press, 1959) 
200. 
19 Official Info rmation Act 1982, long title. 
20 Parli amentary Co mmi ss ioner (Ombudsman) Act 1962 has been replaced by the 
Ombudsmen Act 1975. 
21 For exa mple, the Local Government Offi c ial In fo rmation and Meetings Act 1987, the 
Public Fi nance Act 1989, the Pri vacy Ac t 1993 and the F isca l Responsibility Act 1994. 
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strengthening and development of administrative law. 22 Secondly, state sector 
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s have focused the state sector on commercial 
efficiency. 23 These reforms have also strengthened and increased 
accountability mechanisms. 24 Finally, the adoption of a mixed member 
proportional ("MMP") electoral system m 1996 has created more 
representative, complex and potentially accountable govemment. 25 
Within this framework, New Zealand has a largely unwritten and 
therefore convention-based and evolutionary constitution. That is, the 
behaviour of ministers and public servants is constrained by constitutional 
conventions. These are norms of political practice which have become so 
significant as to be regarded as binding principles. 26 
The most important aspect of the New Zealand system in relation to 
the context in which personal appointees work is the relationship between 
ministers and public servants. The next section examines this relationship in 
order to illustrate the context of personal appointees' work. This in tum 
facilitates an understanding of the constitutional constraints which may impact 
on personal appointees . Finally, addressing the minister-public servant 
relationship indicates problems regarding mini sters , public servants and 
personal appointees . 
III THE MINISTER-PUBLIC SERVANT RELATIONSHIP 
As mentioned, New Zealand has a largely convention-based 
constitution. Evolutionary norms ensure that the behaviour of government 
actors is kept within the bounds of constitutional propriety. Because personal 
appointees are positioned between mini sters and public servants, the behaviour 
22 New Zealand Law Commiss ion Review of the Official Info rmation Act 1982 (NZLC 
E3 1AC, Wellington, 1997) 145- 146. 
23 See for example Public Finance Act 1989, State Sector Act 1988. 
24 John R Martin "The Public Service" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Government and 
Politics (Oxford Uni versity Press, Auckland , 2001 ) 133 . 
25 J Boston Govemi11g Under Proportio11a l Representation: Lessons from Europe (Institute of 
Policy Studies, Wellington, 1998) 2-3. 
26 Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001 ) 273. 
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of these two sets of actors impacts on them. Ministers, public servants and 
their relationship with each other in the modern political context contribute to 
a determination of the status of personal appointees. Thus, the constitutional 
conventions which affect the minister-public servant relationship must be 
examined. The nature of these conventions has been affected by certain 
changes to the political framework. Therefore, these changes, insofar as they 
may impact on the relevant conventions, are first set out. Next, the 
conventions themselves are discussed. The question of how the relationship 
consequently works in practice is then addressed. 
A Changes to the Political Context 
1. Open government 
The OIA reversed the existing presumption regarding release of 
official information. 27 That is, information should be released if there is no 
good reason to withhold it. 28 As discussed, the passage of the OIA constituted 
a key feature of a broader and ongoing move towards open government in 
New Zealand. 
The OIA was prompted by the report of the Danks Committee. Its 
recommendations,29 which were largely adopted in the final legislation, reflect 
the principles underpinning the shift towards open government. First, a 
participatory and well informed public is thought to enhance the accountability 
of both politicians and administrators. 30 Secondly, transparent government 
processes allow the public to "follow and scrutinise the actions of government 
or the advice given and options canvassed."31 Finally, open government 
purports to enhance government effectiveness by allowing for a more 
participatory, better informed policy process and more cooperation between 
27 Offic ial Secrets Act 1951, s6, which was repealed by the Offic ial Information Act 1982, 
s5 l. 
28 Official Information Act 1982, s5. 
29 New Zealand Committee on Official Information General Report To wards Open 
Government (Government Printer, Wellington, 1981 ) Appendix One, 40. 
30 Towards Open Government, above, 14. 
31 Towards Open Government, above, 14- 15 . 
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government and citizens.32 The principles of open government are now an 
established part of the New Zealand system. 33 They clearly have an impact on 
the behaviour of ministers and public servants given that they expose their 
actions to a much greater degree of public scrutiny. 
2. State sector refom1s 
Broad reforms to the core public sector conducted in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s34 have also had a significant impact on the minister-public servant 
relationship. The reforms installed departmental chief executives who are 
appointed for a fixed term. As well, the advisory and delivery elements of the 
public service were separated. 35 Consistent with this, outputs produced, rather 
than policy outcomes sought, became the measure of the bureaucracy's 
performance. 36 Finally, many commercial and other public sector activities 
were contracted out or released from direct government control.37 
The separation of governance and operation in the public sector has 
bestowed ce11ain responsibilities on departmental chief executives personally, 
rather than on ministers. 38 For example, the State Sector Act 1988 gives chief 
executives authority in relation to human resources. 39 Similarly, the Public 
Finance Act 1989 gives chief executives responsibilities regarding the 
financial management of their department. 40 
32 Towards Open Government, above, 15-16. 
33 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001) l. 
34 Allen Schick The Spirit of Reform: Managing New Zealand's State Sector in a Time of 
Change (Report Prepared for the State Services Commission and The Treasury, Wellington, 
1996) 2; John R Martin "The Public Service" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand 
Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2001) 132-133. 
35 Martin "The Public Service," above, 133-134; John Martin "Advisers and Bureaucrats" in 
Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Politics in Transition (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1997) 111. 
36 Schick, above, 74; Graham Scott and Peter Gorringe Refor111 of the Core Public Sector (The 
Treasury, Wellington, 1988) 6. 
37 Martin "The Public Service," above, 134. 
38 Scott and Gorringe, above, 15. 
39 State Sector Act 1988, s33. 
40 Public Finance Act 1989, s33. 
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These reforms were implemented to improve the economic efficiency 
and the effectiveness of the public service. 41 Based on public choice theory, 
agency theory and contractual analyses,42 the restructured public sector is 
thought to be capable of much greater cost-effectiveness as well as better 
delivery of services.43 
The reforms also sought to enhance the accountability of government 
officials.44 That is, they strengthen public servants' personal accountability, 
over and above the accountability imposed through their minister.45 In this 
sense, state sector reforms represent a fundamental shift in the way the New 
Zealand system views accountability. Ministers and public servants are no 
longer always regarded as one entity for the purpose of accountability 
mechanisms. 
3. Electoral system change 
In 1993, New Zealand adopted a mixed member proportional electoral 
system (MMP).46 This came into effect in 1996. The previous first-past-the-
post electoral system (FPP) was based on simple plurality elections in single 
member constituencies.47 As such , it was strongly biased towards single party 
majority govemment.48 MMP is a predominantly proportional , party-based 
system, except for the retention of single member geographical constituencies. 
This tends to favour multi-parti sm, both within and outside of Parliament. In 
41 Allen Schick The Spirit of Reform: Managi11g New Zealand 's State Sector i11 a Time of 
Change (Report Prepared fo r the State Services Commiss ion and The Treasury, Wellington, 
1996) 11; John R Martin "The Public Service" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand 
Governme11t and Politics (Oxford Uni versity Press, Auckland , 2001 ) 133. 
42 Graham Scott and Peter Gorringe Reform of the Core Public Sector (The Treasury, 
Wellington, 1988) 2-3. 
43 John Roberts Politicia11s, Public Servants and Public Enterprise (Victori a Uni versity Press 
fo r the Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1987) 14-15 ; Scott and Gorringe, above, l. 
44 Martin, "The Public Service," above, 133. 
45 Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001 ) 299 . 
46 Electoral Act 1993, s2( 1) 
47 E lectoral Act 1956, ss2, 16. 
48 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government Under 
MMP (3 ed, Oxford Uni versity Press, Auck land , 1997) 12; J Boston Governing Under 
Proportional Representation: Lessons from Europe (Institute of Po licy Studies, Wellington, 
1998) 2. 
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tum, coalition majority, single party minority and coalition minority 
governments are systemically encouraged.49 In fact, New Zealand has 
experienced minority government almost invariably since the introduction of 
MMP. Proportional representation has also increased diversity in Parliament, 
for example in terms of gender and ethnicity.so 
MMP purports to improve the accountability of governments to 
Parliament in two ways. First, government majorities, if they exist at all, are 
likely to be small. This makes governments much more vulnerable to 
Parliament. Secondly, a greater diversity of viewpoints in Parliament allows 
for greater accountability.s 1 Governments are also constrained from within 
where they must work with coalition partners.s2 
These changes to the constitutional framework have added to the 
primary accountability mechanism of ministerial accountability to Parliament. 
That is, state sector reforms and open government have imposed personal 
accountability requirements on public servants in addition to their indirect 
accountability through ministers. Moreover, the accountability of ministers 
and public servants to Parliament and the public have been increased through 
improvements to the transparency of government processes. Finally, MMP 
has created a much more complex environment within which minister and 
public servants must work and has also enhanced accountability. In the 
following section, the constitutional conventions relating to the minister-
public servant relationship are analysed. This analysis is undertaken with 
regard to how these conventions work in the modern New Zealand political 
context which has been described. 
49 Palmer and Palmer, above, 12; Boston, above, 2-3. 
50 Boston, above, l; Bernie Steeds "MMP: Here to Stay? Questions about the Review" ( 19 
April 2000) The Press Christchurch 9. 
51 This occurs because of the increased number of parties and societal groups represented in 
Par! iament. 
52 Elizabeth McLeay "Cabinet" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Politics in Transition 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 91. 
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B Ministers' Conventions 
Ministers and Cabinet exercise the power of government in New 
Zealand.53 Ministers must be democratically elected members of parliament 
(MPs).54 They are appointed to their ministerial posts by the Governor-
General on the advice of the Prime Minister.55 These two features of the New 
Zealand constitution mean that ministers are accountable to the electorate both 
directly, as elected MPs, and indirectly, through Parliament. Importantly, the 
accountability of ministers, qua ministers, is to Parliament. This 
accountability is effected through the constitutional conventions of collective 
cabinet responsibility and individual ministerial responsibility.56 
1. Collective cabinet responsibility 
Collective cabinet responsibility refers to the principle that Cabinet as 
a whole is responsible to Parliament for its actions and decisions.57 Although 
it has an important influence on ministers' behaviour, this convention does not 
impact directly on the minister-public servant relationship. As such, it is only 
briefly examined. 
Collective cabinet responsibility 1s fundamental to Cabinet 
govemment58 and to the Westminster constitutional structure.59 Primarily, it 
allows Parliament to hold the government to account for its actions, by 
53 Elizabeth McLeay The Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1995) 9-10. 
54 Constitution Act 1986, s6. 
55 The method of appointment to cabinet varies according to the political party of the 
particular Prime Minister. For example, Labour Party ministers are voted in by the party 
caucus, while National Party ministers are appointed at the leader's discretion. (McLeay The 
Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand, above, 17 .) In the context of coalition 
government, ministerial appointments are also subject to cross-party negotiation. 
56 Sir lvor Jennings Cabinet Government (3 ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1959) 112-113, 277; Arthur Berriedale Keith An Introduction to British Constitutional Law 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 193 l) 40. 
57 Jennings Cabinet Government, above, 277. 
58 McLeay The Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand, above, 2; Cabinet Office 
Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001) 45 . 
59 Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Study of The Law of the Constitution (10 ed, 
MacMillan and Company, 1959) 419-420. 
18 
enabling it to dismiss Cabinet using a vote of no confidence.60 This power 
ensures democratic control of government action between elections. 
Collective cabinet responsibility also empowers Cabinet to exert control over 
ministers and over the public service. 61 This is fundamental to the 
government's capacity to act. 62 Collective cabinet responsibility can be 
divided into three elements, namely confidence, unanimity and 
confidentiality. 63 
First, the confidence element requires that the government always 
enjoy the confidence of Parliament.64 This is supported by the unanimity 
principle, which requires that all ministers publicly support Cabinet 
decisions.65 Except where unanimity is waived, a minister would traditionally 
be expected to resign from Cabinet prior to disagreeing publicly with a 
Cabinet decision or policy.66 Finally, Cabinet discussions must remarn 
60 Matthew SR Palmer "Ministerial Responsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability: 
Conflict or Complement?" (Paper presented at the Institute for International Research 
conference on "Analysing and Understanding Crucial Developments in PUBLIC LAW," 
Wellington, 4 April 2001) 2-3. 
61 Palmer, above, 2 . 
62 Elizabeth McLeay The Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1995) 200. 
63 Geoffrey Marshall Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political 
Accountability (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984) 55. 
64 Albert Venn Dicey Introduction ro the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10 ed, 
MacMillan and Company, 1959) 420; Sir Ivor Jennings Cabinet Government (3 ed, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1959) 18; The increased likelihood of minority 
government and majority or minority coalition government under MMP make the confidence 
of Parliament less assured than was the case under FPP. In practice, Cabinet has never lost the 
confidence of Parliament under MMP. However, the issue of confidence has been far more 
important and arguably precarious since 1996. At times it has been the subject of intense 
negotiations. For example, between 1996 and 1999 the National-led Government variously 
had to rely for support on NZ First as coalition partner, ACT New Zealand and the United 
Party as support parties outside government, and independent MPs. Thus, the confidence 
element has been revitalised in the modern political context. 
65 Sir Ivor Jennings Cabinet Government (3 ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1959) 277; Palmer, above, 4. 
66 0 Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson O Hood Phillips' Constitutional and Administrative Law 
(7ed, Sweet and Maxwell , London, 1987) 125; A developing exception to unanimity can be 
attributed to MMP's promotion of coalition government. In particular, the 1999 Labour-
Alliance coalition agreement included a clause, which stated that, on matters of "party 
distinction," parties within the coalition Cabinet may "agree to disagree." (The Coalition 
Agreement Between the Labour and Alli ance Parties 
<http://www.executive.govt.nz/coalitionl> (last accessed 22 April 2003); see also Cabinet 
Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001) 46.) However, this exception does not 
undermine the purpose of unanimity. That is, all Cabinet members are sti ll required to 
implement in good faith the decisions on which they have disagreed. Thus, they are still 
accountable publicly and in Parliament for the effects of decisions. 
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confidential in order to uphold the appearance of unanimity. 67 This also 
facilitates the effectiveness of the confidence convention.68 
2. Individual ministerial responsibility 
Cabinet ministers are individually responsible to Parliament for matters 
within their portfolio.69 This convention reinforces Parliament's role m 
holding government to account. It allows individual ministerial action to 
come under the scrutiny of the House.70 Secondly, it empowers ministers in 
respect of public servants.7 1 Thirdly, it reinforces collective cabinet 
responsibility by allowing Cabinet to override individual ministers72 and thus 
to control and coordinate the public service and implement coherent policy.73 
This convention has also undergone some evolutionary change. It has thus 
been modified but not fundamentally altered. 
The first question which an ses m the context of the content of the 
convention is what a minister is responsible for. This is usually divided into 
three categories. First, primary responsibility denotes responsibility for 
ministerial actions and decisions .74 Second, personal responsibility refers to 
personal actions which may impact on the office. Finally, ministers are 
67 Palmer, above, 5 . 
68 The confidentiality principle has undergone some change. Cabinet papers, Cabinet minutes 
and Cabinet di scuss ions are now subject to re lease under the OIA (s l 2). Because the OIA 
opens up government to a much greater degree of scrutiny, confidenti a lity and unanimity may 
be eroded. However, oral cabinet di scuss ions are usua ll y withhe ld under provisions 
protecting constitutional conventions. These may relate to co llective and indi vidual 
ministerial responsibility (s9(2)(f)( ii)), or to the confidentia lity o f advice tendered by 
Ministers of the Crown and offi cials (s(9)(2)(f)( iv)). Alternati vely, in fo rmation may be 
withheld because re lease would prej udice the effecti ve conduct of public affairs e ither by 
deterring the free and frank ex press ion of opinio ns between government actors or by exposing 
those actors to improper pressure or harassment (s9(2)(g)). Thus, the OIA does not go to the 
heart of the conventio n. That is, Cabinet as a coll ecti ve must in genera l publicly support and 
be responsible to Parli ament fo r all dec isions. Making Cabinet documents avail able for public 
inspecti o n does not undermine thi s. 
69 Hood Phillips and Jackson, above, 126. 
70 Palmer, above, 10. 
71 Palmer, above, 10. 
72 Sir Ivor Jennings Cabinet Govem111ent (3 ed, Cambridge U ni versity Press, Cambridge, 
1959) 134 . 
73 Palmer, above, 2. 
74 Jennings Cabinet G0Fem111ent , above, 498. 
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vicariously responsible for the actions of public servant in departments within 
the scope of their ministerial portfolios.75 
It has been argued that personal responsibility has undergone some 
change. Specifically, recent claims that it has been breached have arisen in the 
case of allegations, rather than proof, of impropriety.76 This may indicate that 
personal responsibility has been strengthened. The indication is reinforced in 
that the sanction for these breaches was loss of ministerial portfolios.77 On the 
other hand, such treatment of the principle was really only experienced under 
the first years of the Clark-led Government. As such, it appears to have been 
more an aberration than evidence of evolution. 
Vicarious responsibility has also arguably evolved. There have been 
recent publicised instances of ministers refusing to accept blame as regards the 
actions of public servants in their departments, and publicly criticising them.78 
This may be att1ibutable to more transparent departmental processes and the 
increased focus on direct accountability of public servants for certain 
matters.79 In the changed political context, it would be artificial for a minister 
to accept responsibility for errors which are publicly known to be the fault of 
or within the sphere of public servants. This does not detract from the 
minister's obligation to make an explanation to Parliament and attempt to 
amend such errors. Moreover, change in this area is not as widespread as has 
been claimed but is rather evidenced by isolated publicised instances . It can 
still be regarded as governing ministerial behaviour. In sum, individual 
75 Jennings Cabinet Covernlllent, above, 498-499. 
76 Palmer, above, 8. 
77 For example, in fone 2000, Dover Samuels lost the Maori Affairs portfo lio " in light of 
sexual allegations against him ." ("Ultimatum to Samuels: Resign, or be Sacked" (28 June 
2000) The Evening Post Wellington 1; Ruth Berry "No Questions if I had Stayed with 
Woman, Says Samuel s" (28 June 2000) The Evening Post Wellington 3; Jonathan Milne 
"Maori Leaders who Pushed for Change" (29 June 2000) The Dominion Wellington 2.) 
78 For example, Prime Mini ster Helen Clark publicly critic ised Ministry of Defence offi c ial s 
after they leaked information to Opposition MPs, say ing that "pimping" happens "whenever 
there is some kind of hissy-fit go ing on in defence headquarters." (Phil Taylor "A Very 
Modern Major General" (23 September 2001 ) The Sunday Star-Times Auckland 11); Colin 
James The Tie That Binds: The Relationship Betwee11 Mi11isters and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 27 . 
79Philip A Joseph Co11stitutional and Adlllinistrative Law in New Zeala11d (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 289. 
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ministerial responsibility remains vital m the New Zealand political 
framework. 
C Public Servant Conventions 
Public servants are employed under the State Sector Act 1988. Their 
role is to provide expert policy advice to ministers and to implement 
government policy. 8° Constitutional conventions relating to the public service 
consequently seek to safeguard the integrity of advice given to ministers. 
Further, they ensure that the powers of government are exercised by ministers 
and not by public servants. Since there must be democratic accountability for 
the exercise of government power, it would be inappropri ate for unelected 
public servants to usurp that power from responsible ministers. 81 The guiding 
constitutional conventions, as regards public servants , can be termed loyalty, 
neutrality and anonymity. 82 These conventions have undergone change, 
mainly as a result of changes to the political framework which have already 
been discussed. However, these principles still govern the modem New 
Zealand public service. 
1. Loyalty 
Public servants have a duty to be loyal to the government of the day. 
This means that they must carry out the valid commands of their minister in 
good faith and to the best of their ability. 83 They should not bring the minister 
into disrepute in any way. 84 Underlying these principles is the concept that 
public servant actions lack legitimacy without valid authority. Responsible 
80 State Services Commi ss ion Public Service Code of Conduct (State Services Commi ssion, 
Wellington, 2001 ) 8-9 ; Sir Ivor Jennings Cabinet Government (3 ed, Cambridge Uni versity 
Press, Cambridge, 1959) 126. 
81 Sir I vo r Jennings Cabin et Govem111ent, above, 11 8- 119. 
82 Matthew SR Palmer "Mini sterial Responsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability : 
Confli ct or Complement?" (Paper presented at the Institute fo r Internatio nal Research 
conference o n "Analys ing and Understanding Crucial Developments in PUBLIC LAW," 
Wellington, 4 April 2001 ) 12. 
83 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001 ) 34; Public Service Code of 
Conduct, above, 19-20; Palmer, above, 12. 
84 Palmer, above, 12. 
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ministers , and not public servants, must exercise the power of government.85 
The principles also allow the effective and properly informed development of 
policy and running of government. 
Two major changes to the political framework have impacted on the 
convention of loyalty. The first is the adoption of MMP. In the context of 
coalition government, public servants are often under the command of two or 
more parties. This may result in them being faced with conflicting 
instructions. 86 In such a case, public servants may notify other ministers or the 
Cabinet in order to resolve the issue. However, this still constitutes an 
increased tension in the convention. Furthermore, it is one which may have 
repercussions in the other two elements of the public service convention. 
The second important political change in this regard is the reform of 
the state sector. In pa11icular, as discussed, the separation of governance and 
operation has bestowed responsibilities on departmental chief executives 
personally. As a result, the duty to be loyal has specific exceptions, at least for 
chief executives. Moreover, because public servants are often personally 
accountable for their actions, they face incentives to act in their own and not 
just in their minister ' s interests. In addition , in some situations, who has 
responsibility for an issue may be debatable. These factors complicate and 
weaken the loyalty convention . 
It can be said that the loyalty convention has become subject to 
increased strain. However, generally speaking, it still appears to guide the 
behaviour of public servants. 87 Moreover, the inroads into the convention may 
be justified by the con-esponding enhancement of other constitutional 
principles and of government effectiveness. Specifically, accountability is at 
least arguably more focused and thus more effective. As well, the state sector 
reforms are thought to have improved efficiency. 
85 Albert Venn Dicey /11troduction to the Study of The la IV of the Constitution (10 ed, 
MacMill an and Company, l959) 325. 
86 Colin James Th e Tie That Binds: Th e Relationship Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellingto n, 2002) 20-21. 
87 James, above, 7 I -72. 
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2. Neutrality 
Public service loyalty is tempered by the obligation to act in a manner 
which is politically neutral. 88 The New Zealand public service is completely 
comprised of permanent professionals. As such, their loyalty to the 
government of the day must not affect their ability to be loyal to future 
governments. 89 Neutrality allows for a permanent public service. This has the 
advantage that each department holds "a body of knowledge and experience -
a corporate memory."90 Such experience is of benefit to a government, 
particularly at the beginning of a parliamentary term. 
Like loyalty, the neutrality principle has arguably been modified, or at 
least strained. The advent of MMP has given rise to different pressures being 
placed on public servants. In particular, coalition government has dragged 
them into political negotiations and partisan policy disputes much more than 
was the case under a system of single party majority government.91 
Nevertheless, this phenomenon should not be overstated. For one thing, in 
practice, politicking is not predominantly carried out by public servants. 
Rather, politicians and personal appointees fulfil the greater part of this role.92 
For another, public servant neutrality is rarely seriously questioned in New 
Zealand. 
The OIA can expose public servant advice, which may evidence 
differences of opinion among public servants and between ministers and 
88 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001) 34; State Services Commission 
Public Service Code of Conduct (State Services Commission, Wellington, 2001) 9; Sir lvor 
Jennings Cabinet Govem111ent (3 ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1959) 127-128. 
89 Matthew SR Palmer "Ministerial Responsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability: 
Conflict or Complement?" (Paper presented at the Institute for International Research 
conference on "Analysing and Understanding Crucial Developments in PUBLIC LAW," 
Wellington, 4 April 2001) 13. 
90 Sir Richard Wilson (Speech, 26 March, 2002) 2 
<http://www.civilservant.org.uk/srwspeech0302.pdf> (last accessed 25 June 2002). See also, 
Jennings Cabinet Govem111en1, above, 123. 
91 Palmer, above, 13. 
92 Colin James Th e Tie That Binds: The Relationship Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 62. 
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public servants. 93 This may undermine public perception of officials' 
neutrality. 94 However, the Act allows information to be withheld to protect 
neutrality. 95 In reality, although it may be at risk, public servant neutrality has 
not been called into serious question as a result of more open government. 
Thus, it can be said that neutrality is still a relevant constitutional convention, 
and one which does in fact guide the behaviour of public servants. 
3. Anonymity 
The principle of anonymity is closely related to individual ministerial 
responsibility. It requires that ~he relevant minister speak for and defend the 
actions of public servants.96 This convention upholds the idea that the 
relationship between ministers and public servants is seamless. It also 
buttresses loyalty and neutrality. 97 That is, by avoiding personal publicity, 
public servants avoid appearing to have personal political persuasions.98 
The state sector reforms discussed above have had particular 
consequences for · 99 anonymity. Chief executives now have some 
responsibilities for which they are personally answerable to the media and the 
public. 100 This clearly promotes the likelihood of them becoming well known. 
Open government has also contributed to an erosion of anonymity since it 
93 Arnikka MacIntyre-Daly "The Political Neutrality of the Public Service" (LLB(Hons) 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2002) 38. 
94 Richard Shaw "Advisers and Consultants" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand 
Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2001) 149. 
95 Official Information Act 1982, s9(2)(f)(iii). 
96Geoffrey Marshall Constitutional Conve11tions: The Rules and Forms of Political 
Accountability (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984) 66. 
97 Phillip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zeala11d (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 298-299. 
98 Matthew SR Palmer "Ministerial Responsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability: 
Conflict or Complement?" (Paper presented at the Institute for International Research 
conference on "Analysing and Understanding Crucial Developments in PUBLIC LAW," 
Wellington, 4 April 2001) 13. 
99 Joseph, above, 299; John Martin "Advisers and Bureaucrats" in Raymond Miller (ed) New 
Zealand Politics in Transition (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 108. 
100 Arnikka MacIntyre-Daly "The Political Neutrality of the Public Service" (LLB(Hons) 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2002) 21; Palmer, above, 14. 
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allows departmental processes to be scrutinised by the public. 
101 In practice, it 
is still exceptional and frowned upon for a public servant personally to 
establish a public profile. 102 Further, exceptions appear not to have resulted in 
the calling into question of the loyalty or neutrality of the public service as a 
whole. 103 
Along with institutional changes, it has been argued that there is a 
general trend towards ministers publicly naming and criticising public 
servants. 104 This would undermine anonymity and also risk publicly 
politicising officials. 105 Once again, this argument should not be overstated. 
Instances of attack of public officials have mainly occurred under the Clark-
led Govemment. 106 Thus, it would be premature to conclude that this 
convention has been significantly eroded. Moreover, while they have been 
highly publicised, these instances have not been very many. As such, they do 
not appear to constitute a widespread trend. 
Anonymity has faced a variety of pressures. It has been strained, 
particularly in terms of the separate accountabilities of chief executives. 
However, the convention has not fundamentally altered. It is still a basic 
principle in the New Zealand political framework and predominantly guides 
the behaviour of ministers and public servants. 
In sum, most of the discussed constitutional conventions face strains , 
mainly as a result of the changed political context. Yet they can still be 
regarded as the relevant guiding norms of behaviour. However, heightened 
10 1 Joseph, above, 288 ; Colin James The Tie That Binds: The Relationship Between Ministers 
and Chief Executives (Institute of Po li cy Studies/New Zealand Centre fo r Public Law, 
Wellington, 2002) 16. 
102 For example, former chief executi ve of the Department of Work and Income Christine 
Rankin was critici sed fo r creating a notorious public profile (Simon Beattie "Agony but no 
Ecstasy for Public Servants" (4 August 2001 ) The Sunday Star Times Auckland 5). 
103 MacIntyre-Daly, above, 43, 56. 
104 "Loyalty Has to be Earned" (27 September 2002) The D0111inio11 Post Wellington 4 ; 
Matthew SR Palmer "Ministerial Responsibility ver us Chief Executive Accountability : 
Conflict or Complement?" (Paper presented at the Institute fo r International Research 
conference on "Analys ing and Understanding Cruc ial Developments in PUBLIC LAW," 
Wellington, 4 April 2001 ) 15 . 
105 MacIntyre-Daly, above, 37. 
106 "Loyalty Has to be Earned," above; Bernie Steeds "Prophet's Recipe for Egg on the Face" 
(11 January 2002) Th e Evening Post Wellington 4. 
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strains, particularly as a result of enhanced accountability mechanisms, have 
impacted on the minister-public servant relationship. The next section 
outlines the practical consequences of this impact. 
D Conclusion 
In theory, the minister-public servant relationship is supposed to be a 
seamless one, based on openness and trust. 107 Such a relationship facilitates 
government accountability and ensures government's ability to act. That is, 
firstly, ministers must be able to be properly held to account, through 
Parliament, for the actions of public servants within the scope of their 
portfolios. Secondly, ministers must have a strong relationship with public 
servants to allow for effective communication and effective implementation of 
government policy. 
Primarily, the relationship has become more politicised. 108 This has 
ansen as a consequence of the MMP environment. It is also caused by 
increased media and public scrutiny in the context of open government. In 
addition, it stems from the direct accountability mechanisms that apply to 
public servants. Moreover, coalition government has arguably forced public 
servants into undertaking political negotiations, due to the need for bargaining 
d · 109 an compromise. 
Related to the above change, there has been some undermining of the 
relationship of trust between ministers and public servants. Of course, the 
existence of a relationship of trust depends in any case on the particular 
individuals involved. However, it can be argued that a more participatory 
107 Sir Ivor Jennings Cabinet Govem111ent (3 ed, Cambridge University Press , Cambridge, 
1959) 126. 
108 For example, the relationship between Minister of Maori Affairs Hon Parekura Horomia 
and Te Puni Kokiri chief executive Leith Comer has been the subject of recent political 
debate. In particular, Comer publicly took responsibility for giving the minister incorrect 
answers to parliamentary questions (Nick Venter "Where Controversy Strikes, Often" (20 
June 2003) The Press Christchurch 11 ); MacIntyre-Daly, above, 44-45. 
109 Matthew SR Palmer "Ministerial Re ponsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability: 
Conflict or Complement?" (Paper presented at the Institute for International Research 
conference on "Analysing and Understanding Crucial Developments in PUBLIC LAW," 
Wellington, 4 April 2001) 13. 
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policy process and the fear of policy capture by public servants have harmed 
the minister-public servant relationship. In addition, the Labour-led 
government which came to power in 1999 had an initial mistrust of public 
servants, due to lengthy periods in Opposition. 110 However, this in itself is not 
evidence of a more general decline in the relationship. Further, trust has built 
up over the course of the current government's period in office. 111 It is, 
however, reasonable to suggest that an incoming minister will not initially 
have a close and trusting relationship with public servants. This may be 
particularly the case where the minister has previously been the Opposition 
spokesperson in relation to what is now his or her portfolio. In that capacity 
he or she is likely to have been critical of the department. 112 
A smooth relationship between these two actors is vital to a 
government's ability to develop and implement its policies. Firstly, a strained 
relationship may impact on the effectiveness of policy advice and 
implementation. Moreover, it may limit the extent to which ministers can be 
responsible for public servant actions. Secondly, politicisation runs counter to 
the basis of the relationship and undermines the constitutional framework of 
our system of government. Hence, while the guiding constitutional 
conventions still hold, problems in the relationship between ministers and their 
public servants may need to be addressed. Mitigating the strain in this 
relationship could both benefit government effectiveness and weaken the 
strain on constitutional conventions. 
Personal appointees act in the context which has been described above. 
In light of this, the following section traces the development of personal 
appointees. Their constitutional position is then evaluated by reference to the 
above discussion. 
11° Colin James The Tie That Binds: The Relationship Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 61; Nick 
Venter "Are You Listening, Minister?" (4 October 2000) The Dominion Wellington 11. 
111 Interview with Chris Eichbaum, former Adviser to Hon Steve Maharey (the author, 
Wellington, 8 September 2003); MacIntyre-Daly, above, 43; James, above, 61. 
11 2 Interview with Hon Murray McCully, MP (the author, Wellington, 6 August 2003). 
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IV PERSONAL APPOINTEES 
A The Development of Personal Appointees 
The development of the practice of making personal appointments to 
ministers' offices appears to have occurred incrementally in New Zealand. 
The incoming Labour Government in 1984 appointed "advisers" to many 
portfolios. 11 3 These appointments were made on the basis that they were 
"compatible with the minister rather than because of party allegiance." 114 On 
the other hand, they were not neutral public servants seconded from 
departments. To a lesser extent, the National Government which came to 
power in 1990 also appointed advisers to ministers ' offices. 11 5 As well , from 
about the late 1980s, press secretaries became personal appointments, rather 
than being secondees . 11 6 Most recently, personal appointments have begun to 
be made on the basis of policy experti se. 11 7 
The number of advi sers m rrunisters' offices has expanded 
considerably in recent years . From December 1989 to October 1999 many 
ministers ' offices employed no advi sers and the maximum number in any 
office did not exceed three. 11 8 However, during that time there may have been 
other positions acting in advi sory roles but under different job titles. 11 9 In any 
event, recent data, which is more accurate, shows that there were eleven 
advisers by October 2000, 14 by September 2001 , 17 by October 2002 and 25 
by June 2003 . In that time, advisers' average salary increased from $65 333 to 
$71 396. This means the total cost of advisers ' salaries as at October 2000 
113 Interview with Peter Harri s, fo rmer Economic Adviser to Hon Dr Michael Cullen (the 
author, Wellington, 25 September 2003). 
114 Simon King Regulating the Behaviour of Ministers, Special Advisers and Public Servants 
(The Constitution Unit, London, 2003) 5 I . 
11 5 King, above, 51 . 
116 Interview with Hon Murray McCull y, MP (the author, Wellington, 6 August 2003). 
117 Interview with Peter Harri s, fo rmer Economic Advi ser to Hon Dr Michae l Cullen (the 
author, Wellington, 25 September 2003). 
11 8 This data was obtained as a result o f a request under the OIA to Ministerial Services, 
Department of Internal Affa irs . 
11 9 Richard Lodge, Executi ve Manager, Ministeri al Services (letter to the author, 18 
September 2003). 
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was around $718 663. At June 2003 that cost was about $1 798 400. 120 
Between December 1989 and June 2003, the total number of ministerial press 
secretaries varied between 20 and 27. Their average salary increased from 
$49 136 to $74 951. 121 
Therefore, it has been since the 1980s but mainly in the last few years 
that New Zealand government ministers have developed the practice of 
including personal appointees as part of their office staff. 122 Personal 
appointees arguably represent a totally new role in New Zealand's 
constitutional structure. In fact, some aspects of their role may not conform 
with principles which are fundamental to New Zealand's system of 
government. The following section seeks to establish the constitutional 
position of personal appointees. Next, it is argued that personal appointees are 
a worthwhile part of the New Zealand political framework, on a practical 
level. However, some of their functions may give rise to issues which need to 
be acknowledged and addressed by the constitutional framework. 
B The Constitutional Position of Personal Appointees 
As mentioned, three types of staff can be identified in a minister's 
office. These are administrative staff, public servants who have been 
seconded from departments and personal appointees. 123 In reality, the 
distinction between these three types may not always be clear. For example, 
ptivate secretaries may act politically neutrally and work under different 
governments. On the other hand, many private secretaries will be political 
appointments who have a close advisory relationship with their minister. 124 
Similarly, some ostensibly political appointments, for example many 
executive assistants, will undertake few functions that a neutral departmental 
120 OIA data, above. 
121 OIA data, above. 
122 Colin James The Tie That Binds: The Relationship Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 59; John 
Henderson "The Prime Minister" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Politics in Transition 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 76. 
123 James, above, 59. 
124 Interview with Luke MacMahon, Senior Adviser to Hon Phil Goff (the author, Wellington, 
10 September, 2003). 
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secondee could not legitimately fulfil. As such, the status of a minister's 
employees may represent a continuum between absolute neutrality and overt 
political partisanship. 125 Even where the position of a staff member is clearly 
neutral , work wilJ often be undertaken as an office team. Thus, neutral and 
partisan staff work very closely together. On a practical level, this may blur 
the line between politics and administration. 126 
Personal appointees are employed under the State Sector Act 1988 by 
the Ministerial Services branch of the Internal Affairs Department. 127 That is, 
they are formally employed in the same way as public servants, except that 
they are usually employed on events-based contracts, rather than 
permanently. 128 In addition , they often perform similar functions to public 
servants, for example they may provide ministers with policy advice. 129 
However, their position can be contrasted with that of a public servant 
seconded from a department to a minister's office. Departmental secondees 
continue to be employees of and retain strong links with their ministry. 
Personal appointees, on the other hand, work directly and solely under the 
command of their minister. 130 
More importantly, public servants are subject to the constitutional 
conventions of loyalty, neutrality and anonymity. Jennings has formulated a 
test for determining the existence of a constitutional convention. This requires 
the following questions to be asked: "first , what are the precedents ; secondly, 
did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a rule; and 
125 Interview with Hon Murray McCull y, MP (the author, Wellington, 6 August 2003); 
Interview with Peter Harri s, fo rmer Economic Adviser to Hon Dr Michael Cullen (the author, 
Wellington, 25 September 2003). 
126 Interview with Luke McMahon, above; Interview with Chris Eichbaum, former Adviser to 
Hon Steve Maharey (the author, Wellington, 8 September 2003). 
127 Colin James Th e Tie That Binds: The Relations/zip Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute o f Po licy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellingto n, 2002) 60. 
128 Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw "A Third Force? Ministerial Advisers in the 
Executive" (unpubli shed paper, Victori a Uni versity School of Government, 2003); Simon 
King Regulating the Behaviour of Ministers, Special Advisers and Public Servants (The 
Constitution Unit, London, 2003) 51. 
129 Interview with Ho n Murray McCull y, MP (the author, Wellington, 6 August 2003). 
130 James , above, 60. 
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thirdly, is there a reason for the rule? 131 Applying the first of these questions 
to personal appointees, personal appointees act in a partisan rather than a 
politically neutral manner. The ministerial adviser job profile includes 
responsibilities and tasks of a political nature, such as "providing political 
oversight" and "providing input into the government' s strategic planning." 132 
However, they appear to act similarly to public servants in terms of loyalty to 
their minister. Most are perceived as being completely loyal to their 
minister. 133 They are also, like public servants, largely anonymous - the 
minister is the public face of all his or her office's actions. This is evidenced 
by the almost total lack of public knowledge of personal appointees' role. 
Unlike in the UK, no personal appointees in New Zealand have so far 
personally established a significant public profile. 134 
In respect of Jennings' second question, despite a lack of evidence as 
to whether personal appointees believe they are bound to act loyally and 
anonymously, it appears that they almost invariably do. Certainly in terms of 
their ability to perform their often politically sensitive functions, they would 
be required to uphold these two principles. As well, the ability for ministers to 
be held to account for personal appointees' actions requires loyalty. In 
contrast, personal appointees overtly believe they are not bound by a neutrality 
convention. 135 Moreover, political neutrality would undermine their functions, 
including providing explicitly partisan advice and dealing with political risk 
management. 136 It would therefore appear that personal appointees, while 
legally identical to public servants, are constitutionally distinct. They are 
arguably subject to the public service conventions of loyalty and anonymity. 
Further, it can be argued that they ought to be guided by these two 
conventions. However, they are not subject to neutrality. 
131 Sir William lvor Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5 ed, University of London, 
London, 1959) 136. 
132 Ministerial Services Job Profile: Ministerial Advisor (Wellington, 2003) 3. 
133 Interview with Chris Eichbaum, former Adviser to Hon Steve Maharey (the author, 
Wellington, 8 September 2003). 
134 Finlay McDonald "Murder Will Out" (2 August 2003) The Listener New Zealand 7. 
135 Interview with Luke McMahon, Senior Adviser to Hon Phil Goff (the author, Wellington, 
10 September 2003. 
136 Richard Shaw "Advisers and Consultants" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand 
Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2001) 153. 
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Furthermore, the role of a personal appointee can be contrasted with 
that of a minister. Like ministers , personal appointees are openly partisan and 
engage in party politics. In the case of the most trusted and high-powered, 
they may even be involved in influencing the strategic direction of 
government. 137 Yet they are not elected and are not strict! y speaking 
politicians. Clearly, they are not subject to the constitutional conventions of 
collective cabinet responsibility and individual ministerial responsibility. 
Personal appointees may be appointed from a range of occupations. In 
addition, some may be relatively inexperienced in political life. Consequently, 
personal appointees bring a variety of expertise to their position . Further, 
government departments are diverse in size and scope and also in the nature of 
the functions they undertake. Finally, the offices of individual ministers are 
potentially as different as the ministers themselves .138 As a result of these 
factors, the functions as well as particular personal appointees ' level of 
influence are almost infinitely various . 
Despite the wide range of types of personal appointee, some 
categorisation of their function s is possible. Broadly, three types of personal 
appointee can be identified. The first is that of a political adviser, such as a 
party leader's chief of staff. The role of political advisers may include 
responsibility for intra-coalition negotiations. For example, they may 
negotiate policy positions and deal with coalition disputes and disciplinary 
matters in respect of ministers and MPs. They may also negotiate and mediate 
between politicians within the same political party. For example, they may be 
responsible for chastising an aberrant minister or MP on behalf of the party 
leader. Next, the role may involve management of media issues on behalf of 
their minister, including putting a party political perspective on policy and on 
answers to parliamentary questions. 139 This type of personal appointee is 
137 Ministerial Services Job Profil e: Ministerial Advisor (Wellington, 2003) 3. 
138 Ministerial Services Job Profil e: Press Secretary (Wellington, 2003) l. 
139 Shaw, above, 153; Colin James The Tie That Binds: The Relationship Between Ministers 
and Chief Executives (Institute of Po licy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, 
Wellington, 2002) 20. 
33 
usually expe1ienced and respected and therefore may be involved m 
influencing the strategic direction of government. 
The second type of personal appointee is the policy adviser. Policy 
advisers usually undertake a role similar to that of a public servant. However, 
the advice they give to the minister will be openly partisan. They may also put 
a party political slant on public servant policy advice and assess its political 
implications. In addition, policy advisers are likely to be involved in 
managing media issues. Finally, they may mediate and pass messages 
between ministers and public servants. 
The third and least influential type of personal appointee carries out 
mainly administrative functions. This may be the role of a university graduate 
or similarly junior member of the office. Their functions will be mainly 
confined to organisational tasks, for example in relation to the minister's 
diary. 
Several points should be noted about this categorisation. First, as 
mentioned, it constitutes a generalisation - there are in reality as many 
d'ff f . h 1 . 140 1 erent types o personal appomtee as t ere are persona appomtees. 
Secondly, most personal appointees will engage in some of the functions of all 
three of these types at one time. Thirdly, it is possible for a personal appointee 
to change functions over the course of a career. For example, they may 
"graduate" from an administrative role to one which is predominantly centred 
on managing media issues. Nevertheless, the categories are useful in terms of 
identifying positive and negative aspects of the nature and functions of 
personal appointees. 
A necessary contribution to the political framework is made in the 
exercise of all three functions. This is increasingly the case in modern New 
Zealand politics. Specifically, the work of personal appointees can be of 
140 Interview with Chris Eichbaum, former Adviser to Hon Steve Maharey (the author, 
Wellington, 8 September 2003); Interview with Luke McMahon, Senior Adviser to Hon Phil 
Goff (the author, Wellington, 10 September 2003. 
34 
benefit to both ministers and public servants. The next section argues that 
personal appointees fulfil an important function in the changed political 
context, which neither politicians nor public servants are able to undertake. 
C The Role and Value of Personal Appointees 
1. The New Zealand political framework 
The real difficulty with the Prime Minister's office is that it has 
insufficient people to deal with the amount of work. Chief of 
staff Heather Simpson has really acted as a sieve on all policy 
issues and she has had the job of keeping the Coalition together 
and managing that as well. If political management is to be 
effective, the Leader needs a strong office and MMP has added 
to the problems of co-ordination enormously. There are so many 
different groups that now have to be consulted that the amount 
of work has expanded exponentially. 141 
As noted, personal appointees have been in existence mainly since the 
1980s. Given that government functioned effectively without their help, the 
question arises whether personal appointees are really necessary or whether 
they are surplus to government requirements. This question is particularly 
relevant given the reduction in government since the 1980s. It has been 
argued that they are an unjustified burden on the taxpayer. 142 Their 
proliferation has also been criticised as a desperate response to the declining 
fortunes of governing parties. 143 However, it is posited that changes to the 
New Zealand political context since the 1980s have contributed to and 
justified their development. 
141 Chen Palmer and Partners Wellingro11 Watch (11 October 2002) 3 
<http://www.brookers.co.nz/wellingtonwatch/issues/2002/ 111002.DOC> (last accessed 2 
August 2003). 
142 Hon Roger Sowry MP "Beehive Staff List Grows as Labour's Luck Runs Out" (Media 
Release, National Party, I June 2003) 
<http://national.org.nz/wcontent.asp?PageID=l000l54l4> (last accessed 3 June 2003). 
143 Sowry, above. 
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(a) Open government 
The trend towards open government, as noted, has had an effect on the 
constitutional convention of anonymity on the part of public servants. 144 It has 
also raised questions about the loyalty and impartiality of public servants. 145 
In particular, open government and a modern mass media have placed greater 
pressure on ministers' offices in terms of explaining and defending policies. 
Traditionally, this work is undertaken by public servants. Increasingly 
however, ministers may require political assistance in responding to media and 
parliamentary questions in relation to their responsibilities. 146 Requiring 
public servants to put a political "spin" on such issues would further call into 
question their neutrality and may place strain on their relationship with their 
minister. Such functions are better undertaken by openly partisan personal 
· 147 appomtees. 
(b) State sector reforms 
Public sector reforms have also had repercussions for the use of 
I 
. 148 persona appomtees. As discussed, chief executives of government 
departments have been given explicit responsibilities for which they appear to 
be personally answerable to Parliament and the news media. 149 This has 
implications for the theoretically seamless relationship between ministers and 
public servants. Linked to this, some senior public servants have been thrust 
into the public eye in relation to policy issues. 150 Here, personal appointees 
144 Arnikka MacIntyre-Daly "The Political Neutrality of the Public Service" (LLB(Hons) 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2002) 44; Colin James The Tie That 
Binds: The Relationship Between Ministers and Chief Executives (Institute of Policy 
Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 16. 
145 Richard Shaw "Advisers and Consultants" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand 
Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2001) 149. 
146 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 299. 
147 John Martin "Advisers and Bureaucrat " in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Politics in 
Transition (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 114-115. 
148 Shaw, above, 148. 
149 Colin James The Tie That Binds: The Relationship Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 72. 
150 Arnikka MacIntyre-Daly "The Political Neutrality of the Public Service" (LLB(Hons) 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2002) 36; James, above, 72. 
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can be valuable to both ministers and public servants in lessening the tensions 
on the guiding constitutional conventions. 
(c) Electoral system change 
The change from FPP to MMP has had a significant impact on the 
need for personal appointees. The change has allowed more parties to gain 
representation in Parliament, which has given rise to the need for coalition 
government. Consequently, coalition formation and management comprise an 
important feature in New Zealand politics . This is an area which it would be 
constitutionally inappropriate for politically neutral public servants to enter 
into. In fact, it has been stated that, as a matter of principle, "officials are not 
involved in or present during actual negotiations" 151 to form a coalition. 
Overall, as discussed, these changes have resulted in both a more 
strained and a more politicised minister-public servant relationship. The 
changes have also contributed to the development of a more complex and 
pressured environment within which ministers' offices must work. 152 In this 
context, personal appointees may be useful to ministers and public servants. 
2. The contribution of personal appointees 
(a) Political advice 
Personal appointees undertake certain political functions. In particular, 
they are often instrumental or even pivotal in a government's intra-coalition 
negotiations. For example, Jim Anderton 's chief of staff Andrew Ladley 
played a key role in drafting the Labour-Alliance coalition agreement. This 
experience is illustrative of the advantage of having personal appointees, 
rather than politicians, construct such an agreement. Ladley brought the 
experience of a constitutional law expert to the task of coalition formation. In 
151 State Services Commission Negotiations Between Political Parties to Form a Government: 
Guidelines on Support from the State Sector (Wellington, 2002) l . 
152 Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw "A Third Force? Ministerial Advisers in the 
Executive" (unpubli shed paper, Victoria University School of Government, 2003) 10. 
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particular, the coalition agreement resulted in the successful modification of 
the constitutional convention of collective cabinet responsibility, by 
incorporating an "agree to disagree" exception. 153 It would therefore appear 
that Ladley materially contributed to developing processes of successful 
government formation under MMP. 
Ladley, along with Prime Minister Helen Clark's chief of staff Heather 
Simpson, subsequently dealt with ongoing negotiations between the Labour 
and Alliance governing coalition partners. 154 Personal appointees undertake 
vital work in this area, for which other government actors are ill suited. 155 
Personal appointees are best placed to carry out such negotiations, due to their 
delicacy. In particular, regard must be had for the fact that coalition 
negotiations are conducted between parties. While each party has a vested 
interest in ensuring the coalition is successful, each party also attempts to 
distinguish itself from the other in order to gain electoral appeal. Further, 
party discipline conventions do not apply between parties so disagreement 
cannot be as readily quashed as it can be in the case of intra-party disputes. 
Having Simpson and Ladley strike deals may have been advantageous in that 
they were removed from immediate political tensions and incentives. In this 
sense they can be seen as mediators between politicians. Being in a close and 
trusting relationship with Clark and Anderton also allowed them easy access 
to ministers. The substantial role played by Simpson and Ladley and the 
relatively smooth running of the Labour-Alliance coalition implies that 
personal appointees can have a positive impact on intra-coalition processes . 
153 The Coalition Agreement Between the Labour and Alliance Parties includes the following: 
Where either party leader considers that a di stinctive policy matter raises an issue of 
importance to the party's politi ca l identity, the leader will raise this with the coalition 
management committee which will resolve an appropriate course of action, including 
possibly identifying the matter as one of "party distinction ." In this even there may 
be public differentiation between the parties in speech and vote which will not be 
regarded as being in breach of the convention. Such issues are expected to be 
infrequent and the parties recognise that dealing with them openly and responsibly is 
critical to the credibility of the coalition. Differentiation on such issues will not 
detract from the overall acceptance that the two parties are taking joint responsibility 
for the actions of the government. <http://www.executive.govt.nz/coalition/> (last 
accessed 22 April 2003). 
154 Colin James The Tie That Binds: The Relationship Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/ ew Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 20. 
155 Interview with Hon Murray McCully, MP (the author, Wellington, 6 August, 2003). 
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It is suggested that in the changed political context, political advisers 
may also be of use to public servants. That is, in the environment of open 
government, corporate departmental structures and MMP, constitutional 
conventions of anonymity and neutrality are under increased strain. Chief 
executives may be subject to attack from both ministers and the general 
public. 156 Personal appointees undertake political tasks that may otherwise 
fall to public servants. For example, it was suggested when MMP was first 
introduced that public servants may be required to facilitate coalition 
formation. 157 Such a role would be undesirable since it is highly political and 
would expose the public service to criticism. However, personal appointees 
undertake this function and consequently take pressure off public servants. 158 
The political work of personal appointees also includes answering or 
putting a party-political spin on answers to parliamentary questions, and 
managing media issues. 159 These are areas which it may be difficult or even 
inappropriate for a public servant to engage in due to their inherently political 
nature. 160 It is also important that a minister is able to convey his or her 
policies and views to the public through the media. 161 For example, many will 
not have the media expertise required for these tasks. Moreover, deliberate 
politicisation of policy advice by public servants would run directly counter to 
the neutrality convention. 
However, the media work of personal appointees has been seen as 
objectionable. That is, it is implied that the "spin" on policy and political 
156 Philip A Joseph Co11stitutio11al and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 299. 
157 John Martin "Advisers and Bureaucrats" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Politics in 
Transition (Oxford University Press , Auckland, 1997) 114. 
158 Interview with Luke McMahon, Senior Adviser to Hon Phil Goff (the author, Wellington, 
10 September 2003). 
159 Interview with Chris Eichbaum, former Advi er to Hon Steven Maharey (the author, 
Wellington, 8 September 2003); Colin James The Tie That Binds: The Relationship Between 
Ministers and Chief Executives (Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public 
Law, Wellington, 2002) 20. 
160 Interview with Matthew Palmer, former Deputy Secretary for Justice (Public Law) and 
former Manager of the Law and Treaty section at Treasury (the author, Wellington, 16 
September 2003). 
161 Interview with Hon Murray McCully, MP (the author, Wellington, 6 August 2003). 
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matters may become misleading to the public. 162 This is particularly so when 
skilled personal appointees are perceived to have influence over reporters or a 
dominant voice in the media. 163 A possible example of this may arise out of 
the "Corngate" scandal. This has followed an accidental release of genetically 
modified corn in 2000. A parliamentary inquiry is currently investigating 
whether Prime Minister Helen Clark and other key ministers knew of the 
release but kept it from the public. 164 Clark stated that she would not hide any 
information and in fact released about 1800 pages of documents to the 
media. 165 However, several crucial documents were withheld by Mark 
Prebble, chief executive of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, on 
the grounds of constitutional convention. 166 Clark has claimed that these were 
withheld against her instructions. 167 Moreover, a memo from adviser Ruth 
Wilkie has been released, which expresses disapproval at Prebble's decision to 
withhold and suggests that Clark wanted the documents released. 168 The 
advantages of having ministerial staff undertake media work must not be 
allowed to undermine the public's interest in balanced and accurate 
information about the workings of government. Moreover, this situation may 
suggest that staff exercise some executive powers autonomously. This is a 
matter which is discussed below. 
Personal appointees' media work does not appear to create tensions in 
relationships between personal appointees, public servants and ministers. This 
is because the different roles are relatively well defined and also because the 
personal appointees who are involved with the media tend to respect the 
1. f bi. 169 neutra 1ty o pu 1c servants. 
162 Interview with Hon Steve Maharey, Minister of the Crown (the author, Wellington, 24 
September 2003). 
163 Finlay McDonald "Murder Will Out" (2 August 2003) Tlze Listener New Zealand 7. 
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166 "Difficult Issue" (29 August 2003) The Press Christchurch 10. 
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former Manager of the Law and Treaty section at Treasury (the author, Wellington, 16 
September 2003). 
40 
The most important objection to the nature of the work of political 
advisers aiises from their degree of influence. Personal appointees in this 
capacity are said to undermine the relationship between ministers and public 
servants. 170 Because they are interposed between these two actors, they may 
issue instructions to public servants that do not reflect commands from 
ministers.
171 This tendency may also work in the opposite direction. Such an 
objection has far-reaching constitutional implications and is at the heart of the 
constitutional tensions in relation to personal appointees . In particular, issuing 
their own instructions to public servants constitutes personal appointees 
usurping the role of the minister. 
The exercise of government power must be democratically 
accountable. However, if personal appointees effectively exercise government 
power, such accountability is not present, since they are not responsible to 
Parliament. Moreover, government policy wilJ not be implemented as 
intended if it is not conveyed as intended. On the other hand, an important 
distinction must be drawn . It is entirely legitimate and practically necessary 
for ministers to use staff as filters on the advice they receive, due to the 
magnitude of issues with which they must deal. As such , instructions to a 
public servant from a personal appointee acting autonomously may be 
justified. Personal appointees wilJ often instinctively know a minister' s 
preferences due to their close professional and personal proximity to the 
minister. A minister will have inJ_pJ-i£cfly mandated instructions issued on thi s 
basis. 172 This is an efficient use of a personal appointee; in fact , the ability to 
know the preferences of the minister is an important measure of a personal 
appointee ' s capability. 173 Ministers would have little use for personal 
appointees if they were forced to give explicit and detailed instructions 
regarding every task they perform.
174 Implicit approval is to be distinguished 
17° Colin James The Tie That Binds: Th e Relationship Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Po li cy Studies/New Zealand Centre fo r Public Law, Wellingto n, 2002) 60-61 . 
17 1 James, above, 6 1. 
172 Interview with Chri s E ichbaum , fo rmer Ad viser to Hon Steven Maharey (the author, 
Wellington, 8 September 2003) . 
173 Interview with Hon Murray McCull y, MP (the author, Wellington, 6 Augu t 2003). 
174 Interview with Hon Steve Maharey, Minister of the Crown (the author, Wellington, 24 
September 2003). 
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from the situation of a personal appointee asserting ministerial power without 
authority. 
Usurpation of executive power has been identified as a potential 
problem within the current framework .175 Further, there may be a perception 
among some public servants that this does occur. Despite this, interviewees 
maintained that the exercise of independent power by personal appointees 
happens extremely rarely, if at all , in practice.176 
It appears that overall , political advisers contribute to New Zealand 
government. Yet, their power may give rise to some inappropriate behaviour. 
In particular, they may be perceived as manipulating the public through the 
media. As well , it is possible that they may at times unlawfully exercise the 
power of government. At least, tensions between public servants , ministers 
and personal appointees may arise from the perception that this occurs. 
(b) Policy advice 
A key function of many personal appointees 1s prov1s1on of policy 
advice. 177 Public servants also provide policy advice, however personal 
appointees contribute a useful addition to this. Many personal appointments 
are based as much on expertise in a policy area as they are for any political 
skill. 178 Thus , while these appointees may share the broad political 
philosophies of their minister, they may be primarily concerned with 
providing balanced expert policy advice. 1
79 As such, their role would be very 
close to that of a seconded public servant. To the extent that they are openly 
175 Interview with Matthew Palmer, fo rmer Deputy Secretary for Justice (Public Law) and 
former Manager o f the Law and Treaty section at Treasury (the author, Wellington, 16 
September 2003); Interview with Hon Steve Maharey, above. 
176 Interview with Hon Steve Maharey, above; Interview with Chri s E ichbaum, former 
Adviser to Hon Steven Maharey (the author, Wellington, 8 September 2003) ; Interview with 
Luke McMahon, Senior Adviser to Hon Phil Goff (the author, Wellington, 10 September 
2003). 
177 Colin James The Tie That Binds: The Re/arionship Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Po licy Studies/ ew Zea land Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 61. 
178 Interview with Chri s E ichbaum, above; Interview with Luke McMahon, above. 
179 Interview with Hon Murray McCull y, MP (the author, Wellington, 6 August 2003) . 
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partisan, they can provide a useful party political perspective on policy, which 
would be inapprop1iate coming from a public servant. 
Policy advice from someone who the minister trusts and whose 
ideological and personal views are known to him or her may provide a useful 
alternative to public service policy advice. 180 A personal appointee with 
policy expertise can also ensure the minister is being given well-formulated 
and credible advice. In fact, "a good part of the reasons ministers bring in 
personal appointees is that they feel they do not get quality advice from their 
departments." 181 Furthermore, as discussed, an incoming government often 
doubts the neutrality, loyalty and competence of the public service.
182 It has 
been noted that this doubt usually dissipates over the course of a government's 
term. 183 However, receiving advice from a trusted appointee during this initial 
period of distrust will be beneficial from a minister's perspective. 
Policy advice from outside the public service is also valuable from a 
public choice theory perspective. Public choice theory assumes that 
bureaucrats' advice 1s tailored towards secunng benefits for their 
department. 184 Thus, advice from a personal appointee, who does not have the 
same vested interest in the resulting policy, may balance public service 
advice. 185 For example, in 1998-1999, the minister in charge of the accident 
compensation portfolio, Hon Mun-ay McCully, sought to introduce 
competition from private sector insurers to the accident compensation 
scheme. 186 It would have been problematic for public servants to give policy 
advice on this issue, for one thing because of its potential effect on their 
personal interests. But as well, the departmental chief executive decides on 
180 James, above, 61. 
181 James, above, 67. 
182 Interview with Chris Eichbaum, fo rmer Adviser to Hon Steven Maharey (the author, 
Wellington, 8 September 2003). 
183 Interview with Chris Eichbaum, above; James, above, 61. 
184 William A Niskanen Bureaucracy: Servant or Master? (The Institute of Economic Affairs, 
Great Britain, 1973) 22; Peter Self Government by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice 
(MacMillan, Hong Kong, 1993) 33; Richard Shaw "Advisers and Consultants" in Raymond 
Miller (ed) New Zealand Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2001) 
147-148. 
185 Interview with Hon Steve Maharey, Minister of the Crown (the author, Wellington, 24 
September 2003). 
186 Murray McCull y, MP (email to the author, 24 April 2003). 
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the role a secondee will take up when he or she returns to the department. 
This may taint a secondee's advice where, as in this situation, the chief 
executive has a vested interest in policy outcomes.
187 
Regardless of the actual motivations of public service policy advice, 
ministers may lack the specialist expertise personally to critique that advice. 
This is particularly the case in the New Zealand system in which ministers are 
first and foremost politicians.188 They are thus unlikely to be experts in the 
field of their portfolio.
189 Access to specialist advice from outside the public 
service is therefore useful both politically and to facilitate effective 
government. 
Another aspect of the role of personally appointed policy advisers is as 
an intermediary between ministers and public servants . As discussed, 
relationships between ministers and public servants can be tense. An 
advantage of placing personal appointees between ministers and public 
servants is that a personal appointee can provide a buffer when advice may 
conceivably be unpopular. It may also encourage free and frank advice. In 
this way personal appointees may help mitigate a strained minister-public 
servant relationship. Personal appointees may also mediate between ministers 
and public servants, allowing for the possibility of arms-length conflict 
resolution in delicate situations. 
Due to the need to work to other pressures , ministers are not m 
constant contact with public servants in their departments . Personal 
appointees can provide mini sters with a link to public servants.
190 They can be 
a preliminary check on messages being passed from a department to its 
minister. In particular, ministers are likely to have a direct relationship with 
187 Murray McCull y, MP (email to the author, 24 April 2003). 
188 Sir Ivor Jennings Cabin et Gol'ern111ent (3 ed, Cambridge U ni versity Press, Cambridge, 
1959) 113. 
189 Constitution Act 1986, s6 requires ministers to be members of Parliament. Consequently, 
ministers may not be appointed to cabinet fro m outside the ranks of e lected po liti cians; J 
Boston Governing Under Proportional Representation: Lessons f rom Europe (Institute of 
Poli cy Studies, Wellington, 1998) 124-125. 
190 Interview with Chri s Eichbaum, fo rmer Ad viser to Hon Steven Maharey (the author, 
Wellington, 8 September 2003). 
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only the chief executives of departments. Personal appointees, however, may 
be able to engage constructively with officials at all levels of departments.
191 
This constitutes a significant advantage. Trusted personal appointees are also 
able to get to the bottom of and distil important issues before they are 
presented to a minister. This may reduce demands on ministers' time. It may 
also cut the other way in that personal appointees can deliver ministerial 
messages to public servants. Public servants may be able to use personal 
appointees as an effective channel of communication with a minister.
192 
On the other hand, personal appointees as policy advisers may 
undermine the relationship between ministers and public servants. Another 
perspective on policy advice may be helpful to a minister. However, policy 
advice from personal appointees may be perceived to be usurping the role of 
public servants. 193 This is especially so where personal appointees provide 
advice instead of, rather than as well as, public servants .
194 This situation is 
not constitutionally problematic , since public servants have no monopoly on 
providing ministers with advice and influence. But it may impact on the 
minister-public servant relationship. An example of this occurred in the office 
of Hon Dr Michael Cullen following the 1999 election. Despite being 
Minister of Finance, Cullen refused to employ a secondee from the Treasury 
in his office. Instead, he relied on a personally appointed economic adviser.
195 
Such situations have obvious con equences in terms of creating tensions in the 
minister-public servant relationship , especially where the relationship is 
already not one of complete trust. 
In addition , where ministers feel as though public servants are not 
completely loyal to them , they may rely more on their personal appointees.
196 
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This may itself further undermine the loyalty of public servants. In this way, 
the presence of personal appointees strains the loyalty convention. 
It can also be argued that there is no evidence that receiving advice 
from more sources has cont1ibuted to the overall quality of advice. In fact, it 
may be seen as detrimental to government policy coherence. 197 Furthermore, 
politically affiliated policy advisers are arguably more likely than neutral 
public servants to tell ministers what they want to hear rather than what they 
need to hear. 
Rather than conveying messages, personal appointees may block 
public servants' access to their minister. This is seen as a problem by many 
public servants. 198 In reality, blocking access seems to be more a function of 
constraints on ministers' time than deliberate thwarting of public servants 
objectives. 199 To the extent that "blocking" does occur, this is likely to be the 
wish of the minister rather than simply that of the personal appointee.
200 
Clearly, where a minister needs to communicate information to public servants 
which may be received unfavourably, it is expedient to delegate this task to a 
personal appointee. 201 Whatever the reason, openness and trust between 
ministers and public servants are eroded where this occurs or appears to occur. 
In addition, the efficacy of our system of government relies on the flow of 
information between ministers and public servants. This is thwarted by 
impediments to public servants' access to their minister. 
To the extent that a personal appointee 1s increasingly likely to be 
consulted and included in discussions with their minister, public servants may 
197 Shaw, above, 154. 
198 Interview with Matthew Palmer, former Deputy Secretary for Justice (Public Law) and 
former Manager of the Law and Treaty section at Treasury (the author, Wellington, 16 
September 2003). 
199 Interview with Luke McMahon, Senior Adviser to Hon Phil Goff (the author, Wellington, 
10 September 2003). 
200 Interview with Matthew Palmer, above. 
201 Interview with Chris Eichbaum, former Adviser to Hon Steven Maharey (the author, 
Wellington, 8 September 2003). 
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be left out. 202 As a result , public servants may be ill informed as regards 
ministers ' thinking. This will impact on their ability to implement government 
decisions and to formulate policy based on ministers ' objectives. 
More broadly, it has been suggested that the presence of personal 
appointees undermines the neutrality convention in respect of public servants 
seconded to the minister' s office.203 Quite simply, working closely with 
officials who openly "share the minister' s political stance"204 may raise 
questions about seconded public servants ' neutrality. 205 Generally speaking, 
maintaining the neutrality of seconded public servants appears to be something 
that is at least attempted in ministers ' offices. 206 However, it has been 
suggested that some personal appointees ' lack of knowledge regarding the 
system of government may impede the ability to uphold public servants' 
neutrality. 207 That is , if a personal appointee is not aware of the neutrality 
convention, he or she is unlikely to consider whether tasks being asked of 
public servants abrogate that convention. Many personal appointees are 
considered more senior than their public servant colleagues. 208 As such, 
public servants may not feel easily able to decline work on the basis that it 
would conflict with the neutrality convention .209 While it is arguable whether 
neutrality does in fact suffer under these circumstances, there is a clear ri sk 
that public perception may be affected. This is exacerbated by the usually 
secret nature of personal appointees ' role. 
202 Colin James Th e Tie That Binds: Th e Relationship Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Poli cy Studies/New Zealand Centre fo r Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 61 ; Nick 
Venter "Are You Li stening, Mini ster?" (4 October 2000) Th e Dominion Wellingto n 11. 
203 James, above, 28. 
204 James, above, 28. 
205 Michael Wintringham Annual Report of th e State Services Com111issio11er (State Services 
Commiss ion, Wellington, 2002) 10. 
206 Interview with Chri s E ichbaum, fo rmer Ad viser to Hon Steven Maharey (the author, 
Wellington, 8 September 2003); Interview with Luke McMahon, Senior Adviser to Hon Phil 
Goff (the author, Wellington, 10 September 2003). 
207 Interview with Matthew Palmer, fo rmer Deputy Secretary fo r Justi ce (Public Law) and 
former Manager o f the Law and Treaty section at Treasury (the author, Wellington, 16 
September 2003). 
208 Interview with Matthew Palmer, above; fnterview with Hon Steve Maharey, Minister of 
the Crown (the author, Wellington, 24 September 2003). 
209 Interview with Matthew Palmer, above. 
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In general, personal appointees appear to play a useful role in the 
policy development process. The major concern with personally appointed 
policy advisers relates to their exacerbation of tensions between ministers and 
both departmental and seconded public servants. According to most 
interviewees, this concern is based more on a perception of deceptive dealings 
by personal appointees than reality. Ministers may contribute to this 
perception by delegating to personal appointees the task of turning down 
public servant suggestions and requests for meetings. However, the fact that 
tensions may often lack a real basis does not lessen their seriousness. 
(c) Administrative functions 
The administrative functions of personal appointees are the least 
controversial since they are the least politically important and influential. 
Increased organisational staff is waJTanted by the increased complexity of 
government. Further, ministers face more commitments and come under more 
intense pressure than has previously been the case.2 10 Administrative 
functions may be undertaken by a junior member of a minister's office, who is 
not likely to have much influence. Further, few objections can be raised to 
their role due to the innocuous nature of the functions they undertake. As 
such, this paper does not address administrative ministerial staff. 
3. Evaluation 
"Spin doctors," or those personal appointees who deal with media 
relations, may be seen as misleading or hiding information from the public. 
This erodes public confidence in its democratic representatives , especially 
given the perceived lack of personal appointee accountability. Personal 
appointees can also be seen as usurping the constitutional function of 
ministers. As a result, mini sters are in charge of less that is done in their 
name, undermining the ability of Cabinet and Parliament to hold them to 
21° Colin James The Tie That Binds: Tlt e Relationship Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zea land Centre fo r Public Law, Wellingto n, 2002) 61. 
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account. This means that individual ministerial and collective cabinet 
responsibility are impeded. 
Personal appointees can also be detrimental to government in two other 
major ways. Both of these stem from the tendency of persona] appointees to 
undermine the relationship between ministers and public servants. Firstly, a 
poor relationship impedes government effectiveness by preventing the smooth 
formulation and implementation of policy. Secondly, a poor relationship 
weakens the effectiveness of the constitutional controls on both ministers and 
public servants. That is, the loyalty and neutrality of the public service are 
eroded, or at least appear to be eroded. This latter problem is particularly 
salient since in any case it may not be clear which staff members are meant to 
be poiitical and which neutral. These problems go to the heart of our 
constitutional system. 
These objections to the presence of personal appointees in a minister's 
office outlined above are valid and important. Nevertheless, on balance, the 
advantages personal appointees offer the New Zealand system outweigh these 
objections. This is firstly because ministers work under conditions of 
increased pressure and complexity in government. Secondly, ministers may 
need to ensure they will receive advice that may conflict with the interests of 
public servants in their department. Thirdly, particularly in the context of 
MMP, ministers must engage in a great deal of political negotiation in order to 
gain sufficient support for their policies. It would be inappropriate and 
potentially damaging for public servants to offer them the assistance they may 
need in this process. As such, the work of personal appointees may actually 
work to uphold both government effectiveness and constitutional principle. 
Finally, the outlined objections are at least partly attributable to perception 
rather than reality. Thus, their presence is warranted. 
The next section examines the experience of Australia and the UK. 
These systems are closely related to New Zealand's and have a more strongly 
established use of personally appointed ministerial advisers. As such, they 
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may provide some guidance as to how the constitutionally and politically 
problematic aspects of a personal appointee' s role may be ameliorated. 
V PERSONAL APPOINTEES IN THE UK AND AUSTRALIA 
A Australia 
1. Context 
As in New Zealand, the Australian federal government 1s based on 
responsible government,21 1 with power being exercised by a convention-
governed Cabinet. 2 12 The constitutional conventions relating to the exercise of 
government power are thus collective cabinet responsibility and individual 
ministerial responsibility. 2 13 As in New Zealand, individual ministerial 
responsibility has recently become attenuated as a result of direct scrutiny of 
public service actions. Thi s has occurred through " the establishment of 
numerous procedures to scrutinise official actions, such as inquiry by the 
0 b d 1. · ,,2 14 m u sman or par iamentary committees. 
The Australian public service 1s, like its New Zealand counterpart, 
theoretically apolitical. It is governed by the Australian Public Service Act 
1999. The Australian public service has also undergone reforms similar to 
those which have occurred in New Zealand.2 15 They have included, for 
example, the devolution of some responsibilities to departmental chief 
executives. 2 16 The reforms also enhance public service accountability2 17 and 
2 11 PH Lane An Introduction to th e Australian Constitutions (6ed, The Law Book Company, 
Sydney, 1994) 146. 
212 Suri Ratnapala Australian Constitlllional Law: Foundations and Theory (Ox fo rd 
University Press, South Melbourne, 2002) 35-36; Peter Hanks and Deborah Cass A ustralian 
Constitutional Law: Materials and Co111111e11tary (6th ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1999) 440. 
213 Ratnapala , above, 37. 
2 14 Ratnapala , above, 39. 
2 15 Simon King Regulating th e Behaviour of Ministers, Special Advisers and Public Servants 
(The Constitution Unit, London, 2003) 23. 
2 16 See for example, Public Service Act 1999 (Cth), ss20, 57; King, above, 24 . 
2 17 Public Service Act 1999 (Cth); Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth); 
King, above, 24. 
so 
attempt to improve efficiency. 2 18 As a result, pressures on ministers, public 
servants and the relationship between these two actors are similar to those 
discussed in relation to the New Zealand political frarnework.2 19 
2. Position and functions of personal appointees 
Personal appointees are more commonly refe1Ted to in Australia as 
ministe1ial advisers. Mini sterial advisers were first instituted under the 
Whitlam Government from 1972.220 As in New Zealand, there has been 
almost continuous growth in numbers and influence of ministerial advisers 
since that time.22 1 There are currently 152 political advisers in Australia, 
which is an average of around five per mini ster. 222 Apart from seconded 
public servants , all ministerial staff in Australia are employed under the 
Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 ("MoPS Act"). 223 As such, they are 
explicitly distinguished from public servants. 
There is general acceptance that ministerial advi sers are an entrenched 
feature of federal Australian politics. Their usefulness to government and the 
civil service is al so advocated. 224 In particular, they are central to the policy 
process. 225 This appears to be so to a much greater extent than i the case in 
New Zealand. They offer a significant alternative to public service advice as 
2 18 King, above, 23. 
2 19 Parliament of Australi a Senate Select Committee Inquiry Into a Certain Maritime Incident 
(Australia, 2002) 176 
<http://www.aph .gov.au/senate/committee/maritime_inc ident_ctte/report/contents. htm> (last 
accessed 29 September 2003). 
220 Maria Maley "Too Many or Too Few? The Increase in Federa l Ministeri al Advisers 1972-
1999" (2000) 59(4) Australi an Jo urnal of Public Admini stration 48, 48. 
221 Maley, above, 48; Ian Holl and "Accountability o f Mini steri al Staff?" (Research Paper no. 
19, Department of the Parli amentary Libra ry, Canberra, 2001 -02) 19 
<http://www.aph .gov.au/library/pubs/rp/200l -02/02rpl 9. pd f> (last accessed 10 September 
2003). 
222 Maley, above, 48-52; Simon King Regulating th e Behaviour of Ministers, Special Ad visers 
and Public Servants (The Constitution U nit, London, 2003) 10. 
223 Inquiry Into a Certain Maritime !11cide111 , above, 174; Members of Parli ament (Staff) Act 
1984 (Cth) Part III. 
224 "Shergo ld Speaks Out on the Quiet Revolution" ( 15 June 2003) Canberra Times Canberra 
50; John Halligan et al Th e Australian Public Service: The View from the Top (Coopers and 
Lybrand , Uni versity of Canberra , 1996) 7 1. 
225 Maria Maley "Conceptuali sing Advisers' Policy Work: The Distincti ve Po licy Roles of 
Mini sterial Advisers in the Keating Government, 199 1-96" (2000) 35(3) Australi an Journal of 
Political Science 449-470; King, above, 29. 
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well as facilitating relationships between vanous other actors m the policy 
making process. 226 
On the other hand, the objections raised in relation to personal 
appointees in New Zealand also apply in Australia. For example: 227 
"The activities of ministerial advisers can now significantly 
overlap those of both ministers and public servants , leading to 
confusion as to who should be responsible for what," [Meredith 
Edwards, head of the University of Canberra's National Institute 
of Governance and former deputy secretary at the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet] said. 
"The main factor leading to confusion would appear to be the 
assumption by ministerial advisers of executive authority. The 
increase in the roles and power of ministerial advisers can be 
argued to have contributed to a breakdown in governing 
processes." 
And:22s 
Rather than seek out the truth , staffers seek the best "spin" on an 
issue, whether it 's the children overboard claim or Senator Bill 
Heffernan's allegations. Any information that does not fit with 
the spin is ignored or di storted. 
I wonder whether the PM's staff is capable of establishing the 
facts about anything. The spin-doctor culture encourages 
laziness and an inability to deal with the real world. 
The assumption of executive authority is an important concern as 
regards ministerial advisers in the Australian context. It has been suggested 
that some advisers' level of influence is such that in practice they are able to 
exercise executive authority independently of their minister. That is, they are 
no longer purely the agents of their responsible minister. 229 
The role of ministerial advisers in Australia has been the subject of 
more academic and media scrutiny than is the case in New Zealand. Despite 
this, there has been little acknowledgement of their existence by the 
constitutional and political framework. The Prime Minister's Guide on Key 
226 Inquiry Into a Certain Maritim e Incident, above, 175 ; King, above, 29. 
227 "Accountability: An Increasingly Vexed Question" (2 1 July 2002) Canberra Times 
Canberra 21. 
228 "Politica l Culture Goes into a Spin" (23 March 2002) The Weekend Australian Australia 
18. 
229 Inquiry Into a Certain Maritime Incident , above, 173 . 
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Elements of Ministerial Responsibility refers to them only in terms of avoiding 
conflicts of interest. 230 However, as mentioned they are legally distinguished 
from neutral public servants . 
Perceived problems with ministerial advisers in Australia have come to 
light as a result of scandals in the media. Interestingly, given their prominence 
in the policy process , there has been much less public debate about the policy 
advice aspect of advisers ' role. Rather, the focus has been on manipulation of 
the public through the media and the illegitimate exercise of executive power. 
A particular example of thi s occurred in relation to the "children 
overboard affair. " 23 1 Thi s scandal arose several days prior to the 2001 
election. Government mini sters released pictures to the media which were 
said to demonstrate that asylum-seekers on a ship off the coast of Australia 
were threatening to throw children overboard. Allegedly, this was to protest at 
not being allowed to enter Australia. It was subsequently revealed that such 
threats were not made, but rather that the boat was sinking.232 
A Senate select committee has since inquired into these events .233 It 
found that ministerial staff were instrumental in either deliberately using thi s 
false story for political advantage or at least in failing to correct the story 
promptly and publicly when it was found to be untrue .234 Moreover, the select 
committee ' s request to question mini sterial staff in the course of its inquiry 
was refused. The basis for thi s was an extension of the principle that MPs are 
not compulso1ily required to appear before select committees. 235 
230 A Guide on Key Elements of Ministerial Responsibility (Prime Minister, Canberra, 1998) 
20-2 1; Inquiry Into a Certain Maritime In cident , above, 173. 
231 David Solomon "Unelected Rulers" (16 March 2002) Courier Mail Queensland 32; 
"Accountability: an Increas ingly Vexed Question," above; "Ministers' Staff Get a Hiding" (27 
October 2002) Canberra Times Ca nberra 52. 
232 Simon King Regulating the Behaviour of Ministers, Special Advisers and Public Servants 
(The Constitution Unit, London, 2003) 29; Inquiry Into a Certain Maritime Incident, above, 
chapters 3-6. 
233 Inquiry Into a Certain Mariti111e Incident , above. 
234 Inquiry Into a Certain Maritime Incident , above, 177. 
235 lnqui,y Into a Certain Maritim e Incident, above, 177-178. 
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The report concluded that there is "a serious accountability vacuum at 
the level of ministers ' offices."236 Accountability of advisers through their 
ministers was found to be inadequate given that they do not always act on the 
direction or with the knowledge and consent of ministers .237 Moreover, the 
reformed Australian public sector, as is the case in New Zealand, incorporates 
separate accountability mechanisms for public servants beyond their 
accountability through their minister. There is no reason why this should not 
extend to ministe1ial advisers. As such, the high level of importance and 
influence of ministerial advisers, and the consequential potential for abuse of 
power, was found to justify advisers being subject to separate accountability 
mechanisms. 238 
The report made two specific recommendations . Firstly, it advocated 
making advisers subject to parliamentary committee scrutiny in the same way 
as public servants . Secondly, it recommended that a legislative code of 
conduct and set of values be enacted. Thi s would set out the behavioural 
requirements for ministerial advisers and would also allow for redress for 
breach of the code. 239 
Recent publicised political scandals involving ministerial advisers , 
such as the "children overboard affair," have prompted discussion regarding 
their regulation. The Inquiry Into Members of Parliament Staff by the Senate 
Finance and Public Admini stration references committee is due to report on 8 
October 2003 .240 The results of this report may provide useful guidance for 
New Zealand. 
236 fllquiry Into a Certain Maritime Incident , above, 173. 
237 Inquiry Into a Certain Maritime Incident , above, 173, 186. 
238 Inquiry illto a Certain Maritime Incident , above, 183. 
239 Inquiry Into a Certain Maritime In cident, above, 187. 
240 The terms of reference o f the Finance and Public Admini stra ti on references committee's 
inquiry are: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
the adequacy and appropriateness of the framework fo r employment and 
management of sta ff under the Members of Parli ament (Staff) Act 1984 (the 
MOPS Act) 
the ro le and function of MOPS sta ff in ass isting and advising their 
employers and interacting with the Australi an Public Service and o ther 
stakeholder group 
the remuneration and conditions of employment of MOPS staff 
LAW LIBRARY 
VI Cl ORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
54 
Australian ministerial advisers appear to wield greater power than their 
New Zealand equivalents. Importantly however, within New Zealand's 
current unregulated framework, advisers have the potential to gain similar 
powers. Moreover, it would be desirable for New Zealand to address any 
potential problems in advance of publicised abuses. 
B The United Kingdom 
1. Context 
UK constitutional arrangements which impact on the role of personal 
appointees are similar to those in New Zealand and Australia. The UK has a 
system of Cabinet government, based on responsible govemment. 241 It also 
has a largely unwritten , convention-based constitution. As such, ministerial 
and Cabinet behaviour are guided by the constitutional conventions of 
collective cabinet responsibility and individual ministerial responsibility. 242 
The UK civil service 1s governed differently to its New Zealand 
equivalent. That is, it is governed by royal prerogative rather than statute. 
Thus, conditions of service are mainly controlled by regulations and Orders in 
(d) the means by which MOPS staff are accountable to government, the 
Parliament and the public 
(e) suitable means by which the accountability of MOPS staff could be 
enhanced 
(f) the merits of introducing a code of conduct for MOPS staff reflecting the 
Values and Code of Conduct of the Public Service Act 1999, the key 
elements such a code should contain and the process by which such a code 
should be developed and introduced 
(g) su itable means by which the accountabi lity of the Government for the 
employment of MOPS staff can be enhanced 
(h) the role of departmental liaison officers and their interaction with MOPS 
staff and departments; and 
(i) appropriate amendments to the MOPS Act flowing from the above. 
241 Sir Ivor Jennings Cabinet Co1·ern111e11t (3 ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1959) l; Colin Turpin British Covem111e11t and the Constitution: Texts, Cases and Materials 
(5'" ed, Bulterworths, London, 2002) 227, 443-445; Martin Burch and Ian Holliday The British 
Cabinet System (Prentice Hall, New York, 1996) l 0-1 l. 
242 Cabinet Office Ministerial Code: A Code of Co11d11ct and C11ida11ce on Procedures for 
Ministers (United Kingdom, 2001) chapter one <http://www.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/central/2001/mcode/contents.htm> (last accessed 28 September 2003); Turpin, 
above, 212-221. 
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Council rather than legislation. 243 This theoretically makes their employment 
more tenuous, since it is "at the pleasure of the Crown." However, that 
tenuousness is at least arguable, in practice. 244 The more important difference 
is that the civil service is subject to regulation by the executive branch.245 
Aside from this, the UK and New Zealand civil services share a similar 
constitutional basis. That is, the UK civil service comprises permanent 
professionals.
246 
All members are subject to the constitutional conventions of 
loyalty, neutrality and anonymity. 247 
UK constitutional conventions have come under increased strain m 
recent decades. They still operate under a FPP electoral system which 
predominantly entails single party majority government. However, many of 
the state sector reforms discussed in relation to New Zealand have been 
mirrored in the UK. Similar changes in terms of the greater complexity of 
government and intrusiveness of the media also apply. 248 That is, there has 
been increased emphasis on accounting to the voting public for ministerial and 
also civil servant actions. 249 
Although the same sorts of strains have been acting on the UK 
constitutional conventions, questions about the continued relevance of some of 
those conventions have arguably been raised more seriously. Loyalty has been 
at issue from time to time, but this appears to be based on specific and fairly 
isolated instances of civil servants obstructing government policy.250 The 
243 Jennings Cabinet Goverllmellt, above, 147; Turpin, above, 245. 
244 Jennings Cabillet Govem111e11t, above, 131; Arthur Berriedale Keith An Introduction to 
British Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1931) 60-61. 
245 Colin James The Tie That Binds: The Relationship Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 64. 246 Sir Ivor Jennings Cabinet Govem111e11t, above, 127-128. 
247 Cabinet Office Civil Service Code (United Kingdom, 1996) <http://www.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/central/l 999/cscode.htm> (last accessed 28 September 2003); Colin Turpin 
British Govemment and the Constitution: Texts, Cases and Materials (5th ed, Butterworths, 
London, 2002) 248-252. 
248 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee These Unfortunate Events: 
Lessons of Recent Events at the Fonner DTLR (United Kingdom, 2002) 18 
<http://www.publication .parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmpubadm/303/303.pdf> (last 
accessed 29 September 2003). 
249 Simon King Regulating the Behaviour of Ministers, Special Advisers and Public Servants 
(The Constitution Unit, London, 2003) 15 . 
250 Turpin, above, 252-253. 
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neutrality of the public service has also been questioned and the minister-
public servant relationship has become increasingly strained in recent years. 251 
In general, while some "dilution" of these conventions has been noted, 252 they 
are still regarded as important guiding constitutional principles. 253 
2. Position and functions of personal appointees 
Personal appointees, or special advisers as they are known in the UK, 
began to be used from the mid-1970s. 254 They are now an established and 
widely used part of British government. For example, there were 38 special 
advisers under the Major Government, 67 by April 1998255 and 81 by March 
2002. 256 As in New Zealand, special advisers are formally employed as 
temporary civil servants. 257 They also undertake functions similar to their 
New Zealand equivalents in te1ms of political and policy advice. 258 As in 
Australia, their policy work at times replaces rather than supplements that of 
the public service. 259 
There has been a great deal more controversy surrounding the role of 
special advisers in the UK than in New Zealand. The major concerns about 
personal appointees in New Zealand and Australia appear to be broadly shared 
in Britain. Thus: 260 
In general it appears that special advisers make a usefu l 
contribution in supporting ministers and are able to work in a 
constructive relationship with established civil servants. There 
have, however, been instances of friction and some blurring of 
responsibilities ... leading to a damaging breakdown of trust 
251 King, above, 15. 
252 Turpin, above, 22 l. 
253 Cabinet Office Ministerial Code: A Code of Conduct and Guidance on Procedures for 
Ministers (United Kingdom, 2001) chapter one <http://www.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/central/2001/mcode/contents.htm> (last accessed 28 September 2003). 254 Turpin, above, 254. 
255 Turpin, above, 255. 
256 Robert Armstrong "Daylight Jobbery" (2 March 2002) The Spectator United Kingdom 
<http://www.spectator.co.uk/article.php3?table=old&section=current&i~sue=2003-08-02&id-
l624&searchText=> (last accessed 7 August 2003). 
257 Simon King Regt1lating th e Beha viour of Ministers, Special Advisers and Pt1b!ic Servants 
(The Constitution Unit, London, 2003) 11; Turpin, above, 255. 
258 King, above, J l; Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw "A Third Force? Ministerial Advisers 
in the Executive" (unpublished paper, Victoria University School of Government, 2003) 2. 259 King, above, 16. 
260 Turpin, above, 255. 
within the department and the discomfiture of the Secretary of 
State. Some observers perceive a threat to the tradition of a 
politically neutral civil service, bringing a collective experience 
and objective judgment tc bear on government decision-making. 
In addition: 261 
And:262 
The numbers of 'special advisers' have proliferated and their 
roles and responsibilitie , their accountability, and their 
relationships to ministers and civil servants have been 
insufficiently thought through. 
[Former head of the Treasury press office, Jill Rutter] warned 
that we could be turning the Government Information Service 
into "a powerful machine to secure the permanent advantages of 
incumbency." 
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On the other hand, special advisers are widely thought to be useful to 
government.
263 
The Committee on Standards in Public Life reported in 2000 
that "almost all witnesses made clear their view that special advisers were 
valuable components of the machinery of Government."264 Thus, the 
problematic aspects of their role have been sought to be resolved by 
incorporating certain safeguards into the system. For example, they are 
subject to a code of conduct. 265 The code contains similar behavioural 
standards as for the ci vii service, with exceptions in terms of political 
neutrality. 
261 
Robert Armstrong "Daylight Jobbery" (2 March 2002) The Spectator United Kingdom 
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However, effective accountability is still problematic. Public servant 
complaints about special advisers must be made to departmental permanent 
secretaries. Complaints are eventually passed on to the relevant minister. 266 
Moreover, UK public servants are subject to personal accountability rather 
than just being indirectly accountable through individual ministerial 
responsibility. There is no reason why direct accountability should not extend 
to special advisers. In any event, the nature and degree of power exercised by 
special advisers wainnt close scrutiny. Nevertheless, special advisers are not 
subject to separate accountability mechanisms. 
The House of Commons Public Administration Committee issued a 
report m response to scandal relating to special advisers .267 The report 
recommended that boundaries be drawn around special advisers ' role in 
government communications. More broadly, it suggested a merit-based 
system of recruitment and training courses for incoming special advisers 
regarding the machinery of government and the role of public servants. 
Finally, it urged the adoption of a procedure for dealing with disputes between 
ministers, special advisers and career ci vil servants. This procedure would 
clarify who has fin al di sciplinary responsibility for disputes. It also 
recommended clarification of the Prime Mini ster's role in this process. 268 On 
the latter point, it should be noted that the Prime Minister has little incentive 
to step in on disputes between civil servants and special advisers. Such a 
move could undermine the authority of the mini ster and possibly senior public 
servants involved. Further, the high level of ri sk would expose the Prime 
Minister to adverse public attention. 269 It is suggested that there would be 
little to be gained from giving the Prime Mini ster a role in this process. 
266 Code of Conduct fo r Special Advisers, above, para 22; Simon King Regulating the 
Behaviour of Ministers, Special Advisers and Public Servants (The Constitution Unit, Lo ndon, 
2003) 11. 
267 The scandal arose fo llowing a series of revelations about communications is ues in the 
Department of Transport , Local Government and the Regions. This began with the actions of 
Jo Moore, special adviser to Stephen Byers. Moore sent an email stating that the 11 
September 2001 terrori st attack mi ght be a good day to "get out anything we want to bury." 
The events which fo llowed demonstra ted a seri ous breakdown in the re lati onships between 
departmental c ivil servants, ministeri al staff and ministers. (These Unfortunate Events: 
Lessons of Recent Events at the Fonner DTLR, above.) 
268 Th ese Unfortunate Events: Lessons of Recent Events at the Fonner DTLR, above, 22. 
269 These Unfortunate Events: Lessons of Recent Events at the Fonner DTLR, above, 16. 
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Since November 2002, incoming special advisers in the UK have been 
given training. The training relates to "the roles and responsibilities of special 
adviser and Ministerial codes, their relationships within departments and with 
the Prime Minister's office and their balancing of their political role."270 
In April 2003, the UK Committee on Standards in Public Life reported 
on the controls acting on the government executive, including ministers, 
special advisers and the permanent civil service. 271 The Committee 
acknowledged the valuable role played by ministe1ial advisers who are not 
politically neutral. 272 It then made a number of recommendations relating to 
special advisers that may be relevant to the New Zealand context. These were, 
firstly, that "special advisers should be defined as a category of government 
servant distinct from the Civil Service."273 Secondly, it was recommended 
that the functions special advisers are allowed to perform be codified and the 
functions of particular special advisers be set out in individual employment 
contracts. 274 Thirdly, the report recommended confirmation that ministers are 
responsible to Parliament and the Prime Minister for the actions of their 
special advisers. 275 The Committee also recommended that ministers 
investigate allegations of breaches by special advisers of the Code of Conduct 
and that provision be made for the Prime Minister to refer complaints for 
investigation in the same way as an alleged breach of the Ministerial Code. 276 
Transparency as regards the numbers, costs and roles of special advisers was 
270 Simon King Regulating the Behaviour of Ministers, Special Advisers and Public Servants 
(The Constitution Unit, London, 2003) 15 . 
271 Ninth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life Defining the Boundaries Wirltin 
the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the Per111anent Civil Service (United Kingdom, 
2003) <http://www.public-standards.gov. uk/reports/9th %20report/report/report.pdf> (last 
accessed 24 June 2003). 
272 Defining the Boundaries Within th e Execlllive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the 
Permanent Civil Service, above, 43 . 
273 Defining the Boundaries Within the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the 
Permanent Civil Service, above, 45. 
274 Defining the Boundaries Within the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the 
Permanent Civil Service, above, 48. 
275 Defining the Boundaries Within the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the 
Permanent Civil Service, above, 49. 
276 Defining the Boundaries Within the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the 
Permanent Civil Service, above, 49. 
60 
d t d 277 1 · . h b f . I d . 278 F. 11 a voca e , as was a 1m1t on t e num er o specia a v1sers. ma y, 
added special adviser training and induction was recommended. 279 
As in Australi a, controversy surrounding special advisers in the UK 
has centred on particular instances of powerful but unaccountable special 
advisers attempting to mislead the public. For example, recent government 
communications scandal has given rise to serious concerns about the power 
and lack of accountability of certain special advisers . In May 2003, Andrew 
Gilligan reported on BBC radio that he had been informed that the British 
Government had exaggerated the security threat posed by Iraq. 280 This threat 
had been used to garner public support for invading Iraq. Gilligan 
subsequently claimed that Alastair Campbell, Prime Minister Tony Blair's 
director of communications, had asked that the threat be exaggerated. The 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee cleared Campbell of this allegation . 
However, Dr David Kelly, a Mini stry of Defence weapons expert, was 
revealed to be the official who had informed Gilligan ' s story. 28 1 Kelly 
committed suicide and a judicial inquiry into the circumstances surrounding 
his death was instigated.282 Alastair Campbell announced his resignation on 
29 August 2003. 283 
The Hutton Inquiry adjourned on 25 September 2003 and Lord Hutton 
1s currently writing his report. 284 Alastair Campbell ' s alleged role in these 
events highlights the potenti al seriousness of concerns relating to personal 
277 
Defining the Boundaries Within the Execwive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the 
Permanent Civil Service, above, 50. 
278 
Defining the Boundaries Within th e Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the 
Permanent Civil Service, above, 51. 
279 
Defining the Boundaries Within th e Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the 
Permanent Civil Service, above, 53. 
28° CBBC Newsround David Kelly Inquiry 
<http ://news. bbc.co. uk/cbbcnews/hi /fi nd_out/guides/2003/david_kell y_inquiry/newsid_30840 
00/3084395 .stm> (last accessed 26 September 2003). 
281 David Kelly Inquiry, above. 
282 "David Kell y: Death of WMD Mole" (22 July 2003) CNN.co111 
<http://cnn. world news. printthis.c l ickabi I ity.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&expire=- 1 &ur1ID=695> 
(last accessed 26 September 2003); Hutton Inquiry Website <http://www.the-hutton-inquiry-
org-uk/> (l as t accessed 26 September 2003). 
283 "Alastair Campbell Quits" (29 August 2003) BBC News UK 
<http://news. bbc.co. uk/2/hi/uk_news/pol itics/3191937 .stm> (last accessed 26 September 
2003). 
284 Hutton Inquiry Website, above. 
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appointees. If the allegations are found to be true, Campbell will have been 
instrumental in triggering the UK to go to war based on an exaggerated threat 
and against the wishes of the United Nations. Moreover, even aside from any 
responsibility for Dr Kelly's death, he will have manipulated the media so as 
to mislead public opinion. 
The role of personal appoi ntees in New Zealand is even less regulated 
than is the case in the UK. As such, the potential for this kind of abuse is at 
least as real in the New Zealand context. These events demonstrate the extent 
of that potential and reinforce the need for regulation if New Zealand is to 
avoid similar problems. 
VI ANALYSIS 
Personal appointees play a valuable role in the New Zealand system of 
government. This role appears to be qualitatively different from that of a 
public servant or a minister. Yet there is no legal distinction between a public 
servant and a personal appointee. Thus, the legal and constitutional positions 
have failed to keep up with the political reality. This in tum gives rise to 
potential gaps in mechanisms of accountability. 
Several issues have been identified regarding the role of personal 
appointees in the New Zealand context. The first is their potential unlawfully 
to exercise executive power. Secondly, they may mislead or manipulate the 
public through the media. Thirdly, they may have a detrimental effect on the 
already fragile relationship between ministers and public servants. Finally, 
they may impact on the conventions that guide the behaviour of these two sets 
of actors. Interviewees expressed the view that at least the former two of these 
problems are based more on a perception of inappropriate conduct than 
reality. 285 Nevertheless, given the unregulated nature of their role, there is 
285 
Interview with Matthew Palmer, former Deputy Secretary for Justice (Public Law) and 
former Manager of the Law and Treaty section at Treasury (the author, Wellington, 16 
September 2003); Interview with Luke McMahon, Senior Adviser to Hon Phil Goff (the 
author, Wellington, 10 September 2003); Interview with Chris Eichbaum, former Adviser to 
Hon Steve Maharey (the author, Wellington, 8 September 2003). 
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certajn]y the potenbal for these issues to anse. The Austrahan and UK 
experiences illustrate that this potential is a very real risk. 286 In addjbon, the 
pubhc perception of inappropriate behaviour is itself an issue which ought to 
be addressed. Moreover, where public servants have such a perception, 
problems in their relationships with ministers may be exacerbated. 
In New Zealand, the exercise of government power must be 
accountable to Parliament. However, the doctrine of indjvidual ministerial 
responsjbility is considered inadequate on its own to comprise effective 
accountability for government action. Thus, additional accountability 
mechanisms are used. These include personal accountabilities for public 
servants, which are exercised through providing for transparent processes and 
personal responsibilities. Personal accountabilities are warranted for personal 
appointees for two reasons. First, the problems regarding personal appointees 
outlined above are potentially serious. As well, the perception that the 
problems exist could significantly undermjne the public's confidence in the 
system of government. 
On the other hand, mechanisms of accountability should not be 
allowed to undermjne government effectiveness. The p1inciple of 
transparency may be at issue in this context. It is acknowledged that much of 
the work undertaken by personal appointees comprises politically sensitive 
advice. As such, it would be harmful to subject that advice to public scrutiny. 
However, political sensitivity can not justify the cuJTent level of secrecy 
surrounding the nature of personal appointees' role. Moreover, gjven the 
argument that inappropriate behaviour is more perception than reality, a 
degree of transparency should only enhance public confidence. 
It is recommended that personal appointees be legally distinguished 
from public servants, as they are in Australia. This wnuld better reflect the 
constitutional difference of their role. As well, it is recommended that a 
286 Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw "A Third Force? Ministerial Advisers in the 
Executive" (unpublished paper, Victoria University School of Government, 2003) 11. 
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separate code of conduct be developed for personal appointees.287 In this way, 
their role can be further delineated and distinguished from that of public 
servants, in line with the reality of their position. This may also require 
amendments to the current public service code. The updated codes could 
prevent confusion on the part of public servants, ministers and personal 
appointees about the boundaries of their respective roles. 
As discussed, the UK has a code of conduct for special advisers. 288 Its 
behavioural standards are similar to those applicable to civil servants with 
exceptions as regards neutrality. Therefore, given the similar position of 
personal appointees, much of this code provides a relevant model for the New 
Zealand context. 
The UK code could be improved in several ways in light of concerns 
raised in the New Zealand. Specifically a New Zealand code could be clearer 
about the limits of personal appointees ' functions .289 Specifically, it should 
delineate what would constitute an unlawful usurpation of power. That is, it 
should require that only the minister's views be conveyed to public servants, 
not those of a personal appointee. The code should also specifically allow for 
public servants to have recourse to the minister if they are in doubt as to the 
authority on which a personal appointee is acting. In cases of doubt, explicit 
confirmation should always be sought from the minister. The code should 
also seek to safeguard the minister-public servant relationship by providing for 
public servants' access to the minister. In terms of media relations, ethical 
conduct should be outlined as in the UK code. 290 However, it should be made 
clear that spin-doctors should not engage in extracting political outcomes from 
departments. 
287 A similar recommendation has been made by Chris Eichbaurn and Richard Shaw, above, 
11. 
288 Cabinet Office Code of Conduct f or Special Advisers (United Kingdom, 2001) 
<http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/central/2001/codconspads. htrn> (last accessed 24 June 
2003). 
289 Code of Conduct for Special Adl'isers, above, paras 4-7. 
290 Code of Conduct for Special Adl'isers, above, paras 8- 10. 
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Separate codes for personal appointees and public servants would 
serve an important function in delineating the various roles, particularly for the 
benefit of the public. However, codes of conduct may have little practical 
effect in terms of preventing a personal appointee from overstepping the 
bounds of his or her role. This is because politicking in practice is more subtle 
and the lines more blun-ed than what can be set out in a code. Personal 
appointees and public servants will frequently have to rely on discretion and 
judgment as to the appropriateness of particular actions. Moreover, as 
discussed, many personal appointees are unfamiliar with the workings of the 
system of government, including how constitutional conventions may impact 
on what public servants are allowed to do. As such, more practically effective 
safeguards need to be implemented. 
Primarily, training should be provided to new personal appointees 
regarding the boundaries of their role and the manner in which they should 
exercise their discretion . Thi s has already been recommended in New 
Zealand.29 1 Training should also cover the workings of the New Zealand 
system of government, in particular the need to uphold the neutrality of public 
servants. The UK induction courses could be drawn on in this regard. 
In addition , effective oversight of personal appointee behaviour is vital 
to the ability to hold them to account. It is al so important if behavioural 
guides are to be adhered to. Finally, oversight of personal appointees is 
necessary from a public servant perspective. Personal appointees are in many 
cases regarded as more senior than their public servant colleagues. Certainly, 
they are likely to have a close relationship and strong degree of sway with the 
minister. Consequently, it may be difficult for public servants to maintain the 
integrity of their position in the face of pressure from personal appointees . 
A complaints procedure is required in order to ensure personal 
appointees behave appropriately. In li ght of failures m the UK system, 
oversight by a government mini ster, such as the Minister of Ministerial 
29 1 Co lin James Th e Tie Thm Binds: The Relationship Between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 64. 
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Services, is unlikely to be effective. Rather, independent oversight is 
necessary. One possibility would be to make use of the proposed Judicial 
Commission , which seeks to implement independent procedures for 
complaints aboutjudges.
292 
This would avoid problems of political oversight. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Personal appointees are legally regarded as public servants. However, 
constitutionally they appear to be positioned between their employing minister 
and their public servant colleagues. They may be regarded as being subject to 
the public service constitutional conventions of loyalty and anonymity, but not 
that of political neutrality. In practice, there may also be some tensions in 
their relationships with public servants. Further, personal appointees may 
cause tensions between ministers and public servants. However, overall they 
can be regarded as making a positive contribution to government. 
It is apparent that public scandal and controversy can arise in relation 
to the work of personal appointees. This is evidenced by experiences of the 
UK and Australia. Such scandal understandably appears more likely to be 
focused on two of the identified objections to personal appointees. These are 
the perceptions that personal appointees are misleading the public through the 
media and that they are unlawfully exercising the power of government. Such 
scandal in the UK and Australia has been based partly on actual abuse of 
power by personal appointees and partly as a result of suspicion of 
inappropriate behaviour. 
Interviewees were largely united in the view that little actual abuse of 
power takes place in New Zealand. That is, most felt that only extremely 
rarely could personal appointees be regarded as personally exercising 
executive power. However, evidence was given that public servants feel 
suspicious that abuses of power do take place. Moreover, some media, 
292 See Bills Digest no 1000, Judicial Matters Bill 2003 5; Memorandum to the Hon Margaret 
Wilson, Attorney-General "Judicial Administration Issues" (Chen Palmer and Partners, 2002) 
<http://www. beehive. govt. nz/wi I son/j ud ical/j ud ical_ad mini stration_issues_report. pdf> (last 
accessed 29 September 2003). 
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Opposition MPs and members of the public appear to have similar suspicions. 
This is largely a result of two major factors. The first is the high degree of 
secrecy that surrounds the work of personal appointees. The second is the 
unregulated nature of their role. The latter is particularly concerning given 
that it gives rise to the potential for actual abuse of power. 
Less public controversy suITounds the other maJor objection to the 
functions of personal appointees. These relate to the detrimental effect that 
personal appointees may have on the relationship between ministers and 
public servants and on public servant neutrality. However, in a constitutional 
sense and in terms of the impingement of effective government, these 
objections are at least as important as the first two. 
On the other hand, personal appointees are an established and useful 
feature of New Zealand government. As such, the identified problems with 
their functions need to be addressed before scandal arises unnecessarily and 
public confidence is damaged. Most importantly, the constitutional and legal 
position of personal appointees is out of step with the political reality of their 
role. The reality of personal appointees' position thus needs to be 
acknowledged by the legal framework. This would allow for the 
implementation of appropriate regulatory controls . Such controls must include 
safeguards which protect the integrity of personal appointees and that of the 
other government actors with whom they associate. 
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IX APPENDIX 
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR SPECIAL ADVISERS 
1. As the Ministerial Code explains, the employment of special advisers 
on the one hand adds a political dimension to the advice available to 
Ministers, and on the other provides Ministers with the direct advice of 
distinguished experts in their professional field, while reinforcing the 
political neutrality of the permanent Civil Service by distinguishing the 
source of political advice and support. 
2. Special advisers are employed to help Ministers on matters where the 
work of Government and the work of the Government Party overlap 
and it would be inappropriate for permanent civil servants to become 
involved. They are an additional resource for the Minister providing 
advice from a standpoint that is more politically committed and 
politically aware than would be available to a Minister from the Civil 
Service. 
3. The sorts of work a special adviser may do if their Minister wants it are 
1. reviewing papers going to the Minister, drawing attention to 
any aspect which they think has Party political implications, 
and ensuring that sensitive political points are handled 
properly. They may give advice on any aspect of departmental 
business, including giving advice to their Minister when the 
latter is taking part in Party political activities; 
11. "devilling" for the Minister, and checking facts and research 
findings from a Party political viewpoint; 
111. preparing speculative policy papers which can generate long-
term policy thinking within the Department, including policies 
which reflect the political viewpoint of the Minister's Party; 
1v. contributing to policy planning within the Department, 
including ideas which extend the existing range of options 
available to the Minister with a political viewpoint in mind; 
v. liaising with the Party, to ensure that the Department's own 
policy reviews and analysis take full advantage of ideas from 
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the Party, and encouraging presentational activities by the Party 
which contribute to the Government's and Department's 
objectives; 
v1. helping to brief Party MPs and officials on issues of 
Government policy; 
v11. liaising with outside interest groups including groups with a 
political allegiance to assist the Minister's access to their 
contribution ; 
v111. speechwriting and related research, including adding Party 
political content to material prepared by permanent civil 
servants; 
1x. representing the views of their Minister to the media including 
a Party viewpoint, where they have been authorised by the 
Minister to do so; 
x. providing expert advice as a specialist in a particular field; 
x1. attending Party functions (although they may not speak 
publicly at the Party Conference) and maintaining contact with 
Party members; 
x11. taking part in policy reviews organised by the Party, or 
officially in conjunction with it, for the purpose of ensuring that 
those undertaking the review are fully aware of the 
Government ' s views and their Minister's thinking and policy. 
Status and conduct as temporary civil servants 
4. Special advisers are temporary civil servants appointed under Article 3 
of the Civil Service Order in Council. They are exempt from the 
general requirement that civil servants should be appointed on merit 
and behave with political impartiality and objectivity so that they may 
retain the confidence of future governments of a different political 
complexion . They are otherwise required to conduct themselves in 
accordance with the Civil Service Code, attached at A. Their 
appointment ends at the end of the Administration which appointed 
them. 
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5. Special Advisers should conduct themselves with integrity and 
honesty. They should not deceive or knowingly mislead Parliament or 
the public. They should not misuse their official position or 
information acquired in the course of their official duties to further 
their private interests or the private interests of others. They should not 
receive benefits of any kind which others might reasonably see as 
compromising their personal judgement or integrity. They should not 
without authority disclose official information which has been 
communicated in confidence in Government or received in confidence 
from others. The principles of public life set down by the Committee 
on Standards in Public Life, attached at B, provide a framework for all 
public servants. 
6. Special Advisers should not use official resources for Party political 
activity. They are employed to serve the objectives of the Government 
and the Department in which they work. It is this which justifies their 
being paid from public funds and being able to use public resources, 
and explains why their participation in party politics is carefully 
limited. They should act in a way which upholds the political 
impartiality of civil servants and does not conflict with the Civil 
Service Code. They should avoid anything which might reasonably 
lead to the c1iticism that people paid from public funds are being used 
for Party political purposes. They stand outside the departmental 
hierarchy. They should not be responsible for budgets or for the line 
management of permanent civil servants including their recruitment 
and matters covered by their contract of employment such as their 
appraisal, reward, discipline and promotion. 
7. Article 3(3) of the Civil Service Order in Council allows the Prime 
Minister to appoint up to three special advisers in No.10 who are not 
subject to the general restriction that their role is to provide advice to a 
Minister. 
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Contacts with the media 
8. Special advisers are able to represent Ministers' views on Government 
policy to the media with a degree of political commitment that would 
not be possible for the permanent Civil Service. Briefing on purely 
Party political matters should however be handled by the Party 
machine. 
9. All contacts with the news media should be authorised by the 
appointing Minister and be conducted in accordance with the Guidance 
on the Work of the Govemment Information Service (GWGIS), issued 
on behalf of the Prime Minister. Departmental Heads of Information 
are responsible for managing press and publicity operations in their 
depa1tment, and should be kept informed of Special Advisers' contacts 
with the news media not only to ensure consistency of briefing, but 
also to ensure that contacts are recorded. Heads of Information are the 
department's source of advice on the GWGIS. 
10. Special Advisers must not take public part in political controversy 
whether in speeches or letters to the Press, or in books, articles or 
leaflets; must observe discretion and express comment with 
moderation, avoiding personal attacks; and would not normally speak 
in public for their Minister or the Depattment. 
Relations with the Government Party 
11. Special Advisers provide advice on the development of Government 
policy and its presentation. It is in these two areas of activity that 
Government and Party may overlap. 
12. The Civil Service has no monopoly of policy analysis and advice. The 
Government takes account of views from many sources of which the 
Government Party is legitimately one. Although public funds and 
resources must not be used to support the contribution of such views, 
the Government may need to liaise with the Party, as it does with 
others, to obtain a full and accurate understanding of the Party's policy 
analysis and advice. 
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13. The Government needs to present its policies and achievements to the 
public in order to aid understanding and so maximise the effectiveness 
of its policies, and this is a legitimate use of public funds and 
resources. It would be damaging to the Government's objectives if the 
Party took a different approach to that of the Government, and the 
Government therefore needs to liaise with the Party to make sure that 
Party publicity is factually accurate and consistent with Government 
policy. To secure this consistency, the Government will also want to 
make sure that Party MPs and officials are briefed on issues of 
Government policy. 
14. In providing a channel of communication in these areas of overlap, 
special advisers paid from public funds have a legitimate role in 
support of the Government's interest, which they can discharge with a 
degree of party political commitment and association which would not 
be permissible for a permanent civil servant. In all contacts with the 
Party, special advisers must observe normal Civil Service rules on 
confidentiality unless specificall y authorised, in a particular instance, 
by their appointing Minister. 
15. Special advisers must not take part in the work of the Party's national 
organisation; and although they may continue, during Elections, to 
give specialist or political advice to their Ministers they must be 
careful not to take any active part in the campaign going beyond the 
provision of such advice. 
16. Where a special adviser wishes to undertake work for a political Party 
which does not arise out of government business they may do this 
either in their own time, outside office hours, or under a separate 
contract with the Party, working part-time for the government. 
Detailed rules on their involvement in political activities are set out 
below. 
Involvement in politics in a private capacity: national political activities 
17. Special Advisers must not take part in national political activities, 
which are: holding, in a party political organisation, office which 
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impinges wholly or mainly on party politics in the field of Parliament, 
the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, the 
Northern Ireland Assembly or the European Parliament; speaking in 
public on matters of national political controversy; expressing views 
on such matters in letters to the Press, or in books, articles or leaflets; 
being announced publicly as a candidate or prospective candidate for 
Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, 
the Northern Ireland Assembly or the European Parliament; and 
canvassing on behalf of a candidate for the institutions or on behalf of 
a political party. 
18. In particular: 
1. if Special Advisers are publicly identified as a candidate or 
prospective candidate for Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, 
the National Assembly for Wales, the Northern Ireland 
Assembly or the European Parliament, either by adoption by a 
political party or in any other way, they must resign their 
appointment; 
11. if they wish to take part in a General, European or by-election 
campaign, or to help in a Party headquarters or research unit 
during such a campaign, they must first resign their 
appointment. If they wish their appointment to carry on during 
a campaign, they may continue to give specialist or political 
advice to their Minister as before, but they must be careful not 
to take any active part in the campaign going beyond the 
provision of such advice. They should not, for example, take 
pa1t in public meetings. 
111 . if, with the approval of their Minister, they wish to assist with 
other party political matters such as a leadership campaign, 
they may do so while on paid or unpaid leave or at times which 
do not interfere with their normal duties, for example, out of 
office hours . 
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Involvement in politics in a private capacity: local political activities 
19. With the approval of lheir Minister, Special Advisers may undertake, 
or continue to undertake, all forms of local political activity, but not 
local activities in support of national politics. They must comply with 
any conditions laid down by their Department. 
20. Local political activities are: candidature for, or co-option to, local 
authorities; holding, in a party political organisation, office impinging 
wholly or mainly on party politics in the local field; speaking in public 
on matters of local political controversy; expressing views on such 
matters in letters to the Press, or in books, articles or leaflets; and 
canvassing on behalf of candidates for election to local authorities or a 
political organisation. 
21. If Special Advisers take part in local political activities, they must at 
all times observe discretion, take care to express comment with 
moderation and avoid personal attacks. In particular, if they serve on a 
local authority they must adhere to the following points: 
1. they should not speak publicly or in the Counci I, or vote, on 
matters for which their Minister has responsibility; 
11. they should not serve on any committee considering such 
matters ; 
111. they should not take part in deputations or other representations 
to Ministers; 
1v. they should declare an interest 1n relation to any case or 
application which comes before the Council in which their 
Department is involved; 
v. they should observe discretion in relation to policies for which 
other Ministers are responsible, in order to avoid causing them 
embarrassment; 
v1. they should not disclose to the Council privileged information 
obtained in the course of their duties . 
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Complaints 
22. Any civil servant who believes that the action of a special adviser goes 
beyond that adviser ' s authority or breaches the Civil Service Code 
should raise the matter immediately with the Secretary of the Cabinet 
or the First Civil Service Commissioner, directly or through a senior 
ci vi I servant. 
July 2001 
ANNEX A 
THE CIVIL SERVICE CODE 
T he Civil Service Code sets out the constitutional framework within which all 
civil servants work and the values they are expected to uphold. It is modelled 
on a draft originally put forward by the House of Commons Treasury and 
Civil Service Select Committee. It came into force on L January 1996, and 
forms part of the terms and conditions of employment of every civil servant. It 
was revised on 13 May 1999 to take account of devolution to Scotland and 
Wales . The full text follow s, and hard copies are available from the address at 
the end of the document. 
1. The constitutional and practical role of the Civil Service is , with 
integrity, honesty, impartiality and objectivity, to assist the duly 
constituted Government of the United Kingdom, the Scottish 
Executive or the National Assembly for Wale 
I 
constituted in 
accordance with the Scotland and Government of Wales Acts 1998, 
whatever their political complexion , in formulating their policies, 
carrying out deci sions and in admini stering public services for which 
they are responsible. 
2. Civil servants are servants of the Crown . Constitutionally, all the 
Administrations form part of the Crown and, subject to the provisions 
84 
of this Code, civil servants owe their loyalty to the Administrations' in 
which they serve. 
3. This Code should be seen in the context of the duties and 
responsibilities set out for UK Ministers in the Ministerial Code, or in 
equivalent documents drawn up for Ministers of the Scottish Executive 
or for the National Assembly for Wales, which include: 
accountability to Parliament2 or, for Assembly Secretaries, to 
the National Assembly; 
the duty to give Parliament or the Assembly and the public as 
full information a possible about their policies, decisions and 
actions, and not to deceive or knowingly mislead them; 
the duty not to use public resources for party political purposes, 
to uphold the political impartiality of the Civil Service, and not 
to ask civil servants to act in any way which would conflict 
with the Civil Service Code; 
the duty to give fair consideration and due weight to informed 
and 
impartial advice from civil servants, as well as to other 
considerations and advice, in reaching decisions; and 
the duty to comply with the law, including international law 
and treaty obligations, and to uphold the administration of 
justice; 
together with the duty to familiarise themselves with the 
contents of this Code. 
4. Civil servants should serve their Administration in accordance with the 
principles set out in this Code and recognising: 
the accountability of civil servants to the Minister
3 
or, as the 
case may be, to the Assembly Secretaries and the National 
Assembly as a body or to the office holder in charge of their 
department; 
the duty of all public officers to discharge public functions 
reasonably and according to the law; 
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the duty to comply with the law, including international law 
and treaty obligations, and to uphold the administration of 
justice; and 
ethical standards governing particular professions. 
5. Civil servants should conduct themselves with integrity, impartiality 
and honesty. They should give honest and impartial advice to the 
Minister or, as the case may be, to the Assembly Secretaries and the 
National Assembly as a body or to the office holder in charge of their 
department, without fear or favour, and make all information relevant 
to a decision available to them. They should not deceive or knowingly 
mislead Ministers, Parliament, the National Assembly or the public. 
6. Civil servants should endeavour to deal with the affairs of the public 
sympathetically, efficiently, promptly and without bias or 
maladministration. 
7. Civil servants should endeavour to ensure the proper, effective and 
efficient use of public money. 
8. Civil servants should not misuse their official position or information 
acquired in the course of their official duties to further their private 
interests or those of others. They should not receive benefits of any 
kind from a third party which might reasonably be seen to compromise 
their personal judgement or integrity. 
9. Civil servants should conduct themselves in such a way as to deserve 
and retain the confidence of Ministers or Assembly Secretaries and the 
National Assembly as a body, and to be able to establish the same 
relationship with those whom they may be required to serve in some 
future Administration. They should comply with restrictions on their 
political activities. The conduct of civil servants should be such that 
Ministers, Assembly Secreta1ies and the National Assembly as a body, 
and potential future holders of these positions can be sure that 
confidence can be freely given, and that the Civil Service will 
conscientiously fulfil its duties and obligations to, and impartially 
assist, advise and caffy out the lawful policies of the duly constituted 
Administrations. 
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10. Civil servants should not without authority disclose official 
information which has been communicated in confidence within the 
Administration, or received in confidence from others. Nothing in the 
Code should be taken as overriding existing statutory or common law 
obligations to keep confidential, or to disclose, certain information. 
They should not seek to frustrate or influence the policies, decisions or 
actions of Ministers, Assembly Secretaries or the National Assembly 
as a body by the unauthorised, improper or premature disclosure 
outside the Administration of any information to which they have had 
access as civil servants. 
11. Where a civil servant believes he or she is being required to act in a 
way which: 
is illegal, improper, or unethical; 
is in breach of constitutional convention or a professional code; 
may involve possible maladministration; or 
is otherwise inconsistent with this Code; 
he or she should report the matter in accordance with procedures laid 
down in the appropriate guidance or rules of conduct for their 
department or Administration. A civil servant should also report to the 
appropriate authorities evidence of criminal or unlawful activity by 
others and may also report in accordance with the relevant procedures 
if he or she becomes aware of other breaches of this Code or is 
required to act in a way which, for him or her, raises a fundamental 
issue of conscience. 
12. Where a civil servant has reported a matter covered in paragraph 11 in 
accordance with the relevant procedures and believes that the response 
does not represent a reasonable response to the grounds of his or her 
concern, he or she may report the matter in writing to the Civil Service 
Commissioners, Horse Guards Road, London SW lP 3AL. Telephone: 
0171-270 5066. 
13. Civil servants should not seek to frustrate the policies, decisions or 
actions of the Administrations by declining to take, or abstaining from, 
action which flows from decisions by Ministers, Assembly Secretaries 
or the National As embly as a body. Where a matter cannot be 
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resolved by the procedures set out in paragraphs 11 and 12 above, on a 
basis which the civil servant concerned is able to accept, he or she 
should either carry out his or her instructions, or resign from the Civil 
Service. Civil servants should continue to observe their duties of 
confidentiality after they have left Crown employment. 
Footnotes 
1 In the rest of this Code, we use the te1m Administration to mean Her 
Majesty's Government of the United I(jngdom , the Scottish Executive or the 
National Assembly for Wales as appropriate. 
2 In the rest of this Code, the term Parliament should be read, as appropriate, to 
include the Parliament of the United Kingdom and the Scottish Parliament. 
3 In the rest of this Code, Ministers encompasses members of Her Majesty's 
Government or of the Scottish Executive. 
ANNEXB 
THE SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC LIFE 
Selflessness 
Holders of public office should act solely in terms of the public interest. They 
should not do so in order to gain financial or other material benefits for 
themselves, their family , or their friends . 
Integrity 
Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or 
other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might seek to 
influence them in the performance of their official duties . 
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Objectivity 
In carrying out public business, including making public appointments, 
awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for rewards and benefits, 
holders of public office should make choices on merit. 
Accountability 
Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions and actions to the 
public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their 
office. 
Openness 
Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions 
and actions that they take. They should give reasons for their decisions and 
restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands. 
Honesty 
Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private interests relating to 
their public duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts arising in a way 
that protects the public interest. 
Leadership 
Holders of public office should promote and support these principles by 
leadership and example. 
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